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INTRODUCTION 
Technology is constantly changing with new processes 
and products being introduced each year. The need to 
acquire technology is consistent, and countries must expand 
their technologies as they expand their economies. 1 The 
transfer of technology is important for two reasons. First, 
technology helps educate and promote international under-
standing. Technology transfers help increase the mutual 
respect for each other, and mutual respect is a more stable 
basis for 'world peace than arms limitation treaties. 
Second, the transfer of technologies enriches both nations 
because both countries should become more prosperous. As 
countries become more prosperous, trade becomes more abun-
dant and profitable for both countries. 2 
Problems in technology transfers come about because the 
products and techniques developed by the industrialized 
nations are not always best suited for the country that is 
importing it. 3 Importing countr~es, though, are under 
strong economic and political pressure to purchase new tech-
nology. Once the new technology is purchased they must 
protect their domestic industries. Importing countries hope 
to create employment, save foreign exchange and utilize 
native resources when they import new technology. 4 
2 
Countries that have imported large amounts of foreign 
technology often adapt protectionist policies to protect 
their industries and try to develop extensively. Extensive 
industrialization has often caused countries to spread thin 
critical resources, such as technical and managerial skills 
needed to run industries. This often leads to problems of 
absorb{ng the technology into the country's economy. 5 
The countries that have been most successful with 
technological development have been those that have sought 
selective imports of foreign technology, while taking posi-
tive steps to protect native development. This allows 
countries to develop native ~echnology and still have access 
to foreign knowledge. Countries need to build their own 
infrastructure, develop technology plans, and provide incen-
tives for native research and development. 6 
The ability of a country to decide which technology it 
wants to adapt and improve upon is important. The new 
techniques and products of technology are important in 
development of native technology. The accumulation of tech-
nology can be broken down into three stages: first is the 
ability to make independent technological decisions; second 
is the ability to make minor innovations; and third is the 
ability to create new technologies from previous technology. 
Technology transfer is a complex relationship between the 
import of technology and the development of new native 
technology. 7 
3 
The importation of complete package deals tends to limit 
the ability of the country buying the new technology to make 
an independent choice. This may cause native development of 
technology to be inhibited by indiscriminate imports which 
occur because of clauses in contracts which involve the 
transfer of technology. 8 Native technological capacity is 
of great importance and is a vital part in developing a 
country's native technologies. Countries must undertake 
their own research and development projects as an alter-
native to continued reliance on foreign technology. 9 
Countries should choose technologies which have a potential 
for long-term comparative advantage. Technologies should be 
chosen which are conducive to native technological develop-
ment and restricted when they are competitive.10 
Countries that have tried to industrialize quickly have 
had problems with high resource costs and foreign exchange 
problems. Policies that have aimed at progressive autarky 
have fostered a seller's market which tends to undermine 
technical standards throughout the economy. These policies 
can lead to a widening of the technological gap between 
nations. 11 
Technology properly conceived and applied can contri-
bute to the economic growth and development of a country. 
The use of more efficient technology will help development 
within the country. The limits of technological progress is 
set by the quality of human and natural resources, the stage 
4 
of industrial development, and the economic policy of the 
country. 12 
Technology, when adjusted to the technological level 
and skills of a country, can be an important factor in its 
overall industrialization plan. Techno1ogical development 
is more than just the tr an sf er of hardware, it is the 
;-
nurturing of indigenous capabilities to operate industry and 
to adapt and build upon technology in response to changing 
needs. A technological society must be able to develop the 
ability to transfer technology within its own borders, as 
well as be able to use imported technology. 13 
The Soviet Union is one country which has imported 
technology from foreign sources for many years. Before the 
Soviets came to power in 1917, Russia had been dependent on 
the West for much of its new technology and there was sub-
stantial Western investment in Russia. After the Bolsheviks 
seized power in 1917, they expropriated all Western invest-
ments without compensation. Three years after the revolu-
tion, Lenin invited Western firms to set up concessions in 
the Soviet Union. A total of 350 concessions were set up, 
which had an extraordinary effect on the economy. 14 
The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1933) relied heavily 
upon Western technology and management. Two-thirds of the 
large industrial projects were built with American assis-
tance. In 1930, the United States' exports alone reached an 
all-time high of $230 million, but by 1932 exports had 
5 
fallen to less than $28 million. By 1933 all concessions 
had ceased to exist. The reason for the drop in technology 
was that the Soviet Union had attained a considerable degree 
of industrial self sufficiency.15 
During the Second World War the Soviet Union received 
another infusion of Western technology into its economic 
, 
system. Under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received $2.6 
billion worth of non-military goods from the United States, 
including $1.25 billion of the latest American industrial 
equip~ent. The Soviet Union also received $10 billion worth 
of industrial and military equipment dismantled from Germany 
and shipped back to the Soviet Union. From the Soviet zone 
they acquired several thousand plants, representing forty-
one percent of Germany's 1943 capacity and still removed 
another twenty-five percent from the Western Allied zone. 
The Soviets also needed specialists to bring the industrial 
capacity into operation and to develop it further, so 
technicians were shipped to the Soviet Union. 16 
The Soviet Union, in the late 1950s started to import 
technology from the West. After the death of Stalin the 
Soviet leaders recognized that there was a large techno-
logical gap separating them from the developed countries. 
The Seven-Year Plan started in 1958, was designed to 
industrialize the Soviet Union by using technology from the 
West. 17 
6 
The Nixon administration, in 1969, signed into law the 
Export Administration Act, which replaced the Export Control 
Act. The Export Administration Act greatly liberalized 
restrictions on the export of goods and technology to the 
Soviet Union. The law continued to ban the export of 
technology that would "make a significant contribution to 
the mi!itary potential" of the Soviet Union, but allowed 
technology which would contribute to the Soviet Union's 
"economic potential. 1118 
The last two years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 1979 
and 1980, were unusually poor years for the Soviet economy. 
The gross national product grew at an average rate of 1.2 
percent per year. 19 The five-year growth target set in 1976 
was 4.7 percent growth rate, but even this modest growth 
rate was not met. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan targets of 
gross national product was set at 4.0 percent per year, 
lower than the preceding five-year plan. 20 The Soviet 
leaders are hoping that their economy will improve by im-
proving the productivity of labor and capital. In order to 
achieve better labor productivity, better management and 
more efficient technological innovations are needed. 21 
The effects of technology transfers on the Soviet 
economy depend upon the ability of the Soviet Union to 
increase productivity from the new technology. The danger 
of technology transfer from the West to the Soviet Union is 
not so much the possibility of a quick short-term jump in 
7 
military technology, but rather the long-term growth and 
expansion of the civilian industries that will help create a 
broad infrastructure for the new military system of 
tomorrow. 22 
Problem Statement 
If the Soviets are using their newly imported tech-
nology to its fullest potential, then the Soviets should be 
able to absorb the new technology into its economic system 
and diffuse it beyond one or two showcase locations, and 
they should be able to build upon the new technology to 
create the next generation of technology rather than waiting 
to import it from the West. 
General Problem 
The effect of technology transfer on the Soviet Union's 
economy depends on how it absorbs and diffuses it into its 
economy. The danger for the West in transferring technology 
to the Soviet Union is not from short-term military advances 
that might come about, but from long-term growth and 
expansion of its civilian industries. The growth and expan-
sion of the civilian industries could help build an infra-
structure on which to build its military power in the 
future. The Soviet leaders are trying to improve their 
civilian industries by increasing their productivity of 
labor capital. To increase the productivity of labor and 
8 
capital they have turned to the West for the needed tech-
nological innovation. 
Methodology 
It is the intent of this study to compare case studies 
on the Soviet chemical and petroleum industries. These 
studies should show whether or not the high priority status 
I" 
these industries have to import Western technology has 
allowed them to build upon the technology and create their 
own new technology. The studies should also show if time is 
an important factor in the Soviet Union becoming a more 
innovative nation, since the chemical industry has been 
importing Western technology in large amounts since 1958, 
and the petroleum industry started to import large amounts 
in 1973. 
Terminology 
The word technology can cause some confusion depending 
on whom you are discussing it with. Businessmen, politi-
cians, military specialists and economists have their own 
literature on the subject and approach it differently 
depending on their professional biases. For this paper 
technology is a set of skills, procedures and technical 
information that amount to a capability to produce a certain 
product or to employ a certain process in production. 23 
Technology transfer is the acquisition of needed information 
from one country by another. It includes materials and 
9 
equipment which are not available in the receiving country, 
minor but consequential design features that need to be 
known, and manufacturing and organizational skills that are 
not available in the receiving country. 24 
Technological change is likely to take place in 
"embodied" (in new equipment) form rather than "disembodied" 
(implemented with pre-existing capital goods). Technologi-
cal changes are not free goods, there is a cost to implement 
them. Technical change, though, enhances the productivity 
of resources making finished goods more cost effective. In 
today's world there is normally only one innovator of a 
given product or process. The spread of the innovation to 
other business units or production units is generally 
ref erred to as "diffusion. n 25 
There are important distinctions between different 
types of technology transfers. There a.re "material" trans-
fer, "design" transfer and "capacity" tr an sf er. "Material" 
transfer is when a country that does not produce a · product 
decides to increase productivity by importing the needed 
product. "Design" transfer is when a country increases 
productivity by importing a plant to make the product. 
"Capacity" transfer is when the country goes beyond impor-
ting a plant but also gains the capability to replicate such 
a plant from domestic resources. The development of a 
capability to independently modify and improve the plant 
design is the next step, but this would be done by 
10 
indigenous resources. It is generally believed that in the 
case of the Soviet Union, design and capacity transfers are 
of predominant importance. 26 
International technology transfer is any process 
whereby the productivity of resources of one country can be 
increased by the transmission from other countries of know-
ledge, whether it be embodied or disembodied. Technology 
tran£fer can be deliberately arranged by the supplier, or 
transfer not arranged by the supplier. Technology transfers 
are identified by their potential to raise the productivity 
of resources, not by their actually increasing it. 27 
There are many ways that the transfer of technology can 
take place. Technology can be transferred by traveling 
scientists and technologists who communicate with others 
from other countries about technological information; by 
reading foreign technical literature; the purchase of 
foreign licenses, know-how and training; industrial espio-
nage; the purchase of individual foreign products to be 
reverse-engineered; the purchase of foreign goods for direct 
use; cooperation with foreign firms or other organizations 
in research and development and production. 28 
Some of these channels of . transfer require the active 
participation of the foreign supplier of the technology, 
while other channels do not require the organization or firm 
which has the information to know that the transfer is 
taking place. Governments, in some cases, exercise 
11 
considerable control over the supplier of certain tech-
nologies and in other cases the control of technology is 
almost impossible. Technology is also transferred 
"embodied" in products while others are disembodied. A 
large part of the technologies that are transferred from 
Western governments to the Soviet Union are commercial 
transfers which are to some extent controlled by Western 
governments. 29 
Commercial transfers include the following: capital-
goods and know-how purchases or other bilaterally agreed 
supplies on a large scale; direct foreign investment and 
cooperation in science and technology that is greater than 
an occasional visit by scientists. Commercial transfers 
require a fair deal of persona1 contact, long visits by 
scientists and sustained cooperation between citizens of 
both countries. 30 
Technology comes mostly from a few highly industri-
alized countries. Technology which is transferred is 
usually proven technology, technology that has been accepted 
by industrial executives and other technologists. The 
transfer of unproven, uncommercialized technology is likely 
to be risky and relatively costly. The cost of technology 
can also be influenced by whether or not the transferrer had 
previous experience of starting-up manufacture with the new 
technology. Countries that seek new technology do not 
usually buy "the latest in technology" but rather buy 
12 
technology which has been proven. The buyers of new tech-
nology ar~ usually aware of the problems of buying unproven 
technology and therefore insist on performance guarantees 
that it be proven. In an area where technology changes 
quickly the transferrer is likely to be selling proven 
technology while developing the next generation of technol-
ogy in the field. The transferrer usually tends to maintain 
some~leadtime a~vantage over those to whom they sell. 31 
The Soviet Union buys technology in basically two 
forms, "know-how" or "do-how." They buy the right to use a 
particular patented process to improve their efficiency or 
to extend the range of output. In doing this they are 
buying the "know-how" in the form of drawings, layouts, 
machinery lists, process details, and control information. 
The Soviet Union also buys complete plants which is both the 
"do-how" and the "know-how." The Soviet Union buys the 
authority to use a process with all the technical detail, 
along with a staff trained in the art of the process who 
train Soviet workers and are responsible for the startup of 
the plant, and sometimes there are clauses which require the 
updating of plants with newer technology. 32 
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CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
The Soviet chemical industry is important to the Soviet 
economy. The chemical industry was one of the first 
industries to receive high priority status after the death 
of Stalin. The "chemicalization" drive was started by 
Khruschev and remains as one of the few programs he started. 
The need for access to Western technology to complete the 
chemicalization drive led to the Soviet policy of "peaceful 
co-existance." 1 
History of Soviet Chemical Industry 
The modern chemical industry began in the late eigh-
teenth century and developed rapidly in the nineteenth cen-
tury throughout Europe, especially Britain and Germany. The 
Russian chemical industry lagged behind the developed 
European countries and was still in its infancy when the 
First World War broke out. There were several notable 
developments that occurred during the nineteenth century in 
Russia. Russia was the first country to have a large-scale 
industrial plant to manufacture · sulphuric acid based on the 
catalytic contact process and the production of soda by the 
Solvay process, but these were exceptions. 2 
15 
16 
Prior to the First World War large segments of the 
Russian chemical industry were owned and managed by foreign 
businessmen. This caused a number of negative features 
which inhibited indigenous development. The chemical 
engineering industry in Russia was extremely weak and most 
of its machines were imported from more developed 
countries. 3 
rAfter the 1917 revolution the Soviet Union embarked on 
the road of creating a new economic and social order which 
was an antithesis of Western capitalism. The Soviet readi-
ness to accept Western technology was an exception to its 
tendency towards closeness and hostility in respect to the 
West. 4 The rejection of the free market, the essence of 
capitalism, was not only rejected by the founders of social-
ism in the Soviet Union but was suppressed by the applica-
tion of strict central control over economic activity. The 
marketplace, though, has been one of mankind's most ancient 
institutions and the success of the Soviet Union to elimi-
nate it for good has been limited. The role of the market-
element in their economy's functioning has increased and 
decreased over the years. 5 
From 1917 to 1921 the Soviet economy was totally nation-
alized and run on strict principles of centralism and tight 
control over the limited resources and productive capacity 
that still operated. After the revolution and civil war, 
Lenin realized that the peacetime task was to restore the 
17 
Soviet Union to its pre-war levels of production and that 
this could not be accomplished by tight controls. In 1921, 
the Soviet Union changed from the strict controlled economy 
to a semi-market based economy which was known as the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). NEP was a partial de-nationalization 
-of the means of production; large industry, banking and 
foreign trade remained under the central government but 
r 
small traders and manufacturers were given a freer hand in 
conducting their affairs. Peasants were allowed to produce 
for the market, industrial managers, civil servants, and 
other professionals returned to their jobs. Foreign capital 
was allowed into the country in the form of concessions 
given mainly by industries extracting and processing raw 
materials. NEP showed that the Soviet leaders . and their 
system were capable of pragmatism and flexibility on the one 
hand and extreme inflexibility on the other. 6 
The chemical industry rebounded during NEP in the 
1920s. Under Glavkhim, the department for the development 
of the chemical industry, the chemical industry began to be 
restored to its pre-war levels. Much of the restoration 
came from Europe in the form of concessions and technical 
agreements that were arranged between the new Soviet govern-
ment and foreign firms. By the late 1920s restoration of 
the chemical industry had been completed to the pre-war 
levels. 7 
18 
Stalin, in 1928-29, embarked upon a course of breakneck 
industrialization and collectivization, at a speed never 
exceeded before. The economic system responded from the 
- revolution from above which can be regarded as the 
restoration of the principles of strict central government 
planning at the expense of a free-market economy. The 
market was squeezed out. 8 
During the period of forced industrialization that 
succeeded NEP, the chemical industry's base developed 
rapidly. The Soviet Union tried to catch up with the 
leading Western countries by creating and expanding basic 
branches of the Soviet chemical industry. The Soviet Union 
rapidly enlarged its capacity for the production of basic 
inorganic and organic chemical, chemical fertilizers and 
some synthetic materials. 9 
The Soviet Union acquired Western technology by various 
means, during NEP and through Stalin's rule. Complete 
plants and machines were imported along with Western engi-
neers who supervised and trained Soviet workers and engi-
nee rs. The Soviet Union also acquired technology through 
reverse engineering by dismantling a prototype bought in the 
West and seeing how it worked. 1 ~ 
Since the 1930s the Soviet Union has been successful in 
laying the basic foundation for its chemical industry, and 
the · chemical industry has grown at a rapid pace. The Soviet 
Union's chemical industry has grown rapidly but there 
19 
still exists a wide gulf between the Soviet Union and the 
United States.11 
After the death of Stalin in the 1950s the Soviet 
leaders became more aware of the technology gap. The Soviet 
Union responded to this gap by initiating an impressive 
program of rapid modernization of their economy. In 1958, 
the plan to instigate a chemical modernization plan started. 
"Chem"icalization," as the plan came to be known, was heavily 
dependent upon Western imports, and/or the manufacturing 
licenses because the research was intensive. Soviet lack of 
research and development expertise in the area was especial-
ly pronounced. This was in part due to the excessive 
reliance upon coal by the Soviet Union over the preceding 
years. 12 
The Soviet chemical industry developed quickly after 
Khruschev, in 1958, started a major industrial campaign to 
modernize the industry. This drive was in keeping with the 
nature of the Soviet system. The "chemicalization" drive 
remains one of the few programs today that was started by 
Khruschev. Khruschev recognized that the future of the 
chemicalization drive depended upon freer access to the 
fruits of technological progress. Out of this grew the 
policy of "peaceful co-existence." "Chemicalization" 
implied a rapid expansion of output of a whole range of 
synthetic materials previously not made in the Soviet Union. 
These synthetic materials were to replace, where possible, 
20 
the traditional materials. In agriculture, chemical fer-
tilizers were intended to play a major role in efforts to 
increase the yield of crop lands and ultimately meat and 
dairy products. 1 3 
The creation of a synthetic material industry required 
the Soviet Union to switch its feedstock from coal to oil 
and natural gas because a modern chemical industry is based 
on the petrochemical industry. The "chemicalization" pro-
gram has required a tremendous injection of capital. 
"Chemicalization" constitutes one of the most important 
pillars in the strategy of intensive economic growth. It 
implies an expansion throughout the economy of the use of 
new materials which are research and development intensive, 
but when used in industry, agriculture, and construction, 
b~ing about vast savings when they replace expensive tradi-
tional materials and the labor hours involved in handling 
the traditional materials. 14 
Over the past twenty plus years of "chemicalization," 
the Soviet Union has continued to import technology and has 
commercial relations with Western multinationals. These 
relations have increased in scope and have become more 
varied. 15 In the early 1970s the transfer of Western 
technology to the Soviet Union became a public issue. The 
transfer of Western technology to the Soviet Union had been 
occurring since the Russian Revolution in 1917, but it did 
not become a public issue because the amount of it was so 
21 
small. The first major deal to draw attention was the Fiat 
Tolyatti deal. This contract called for the construction of 
a huge car-making complex in the USSR incorporating Fiat 
technology. The second deal involved Ford and the USSR. 
The Kama River truck~making complex (known as KamAZ) 
involved massive amounts of Western machinery and know-how. 
The third factor for increased trade between the West and 
the Soviet Union grew out of trade agreements signed between 
the Soviet government and the Nixon administration in 1972. 
These three agreements in retrospect have been especially 
effective in focusing public attention on West-East tech-
nology transfers.1 6 
In the 1970s a wide range of views were expressed 
about the impact of West-East technology transfer. Was the 
West allowing the Soviet Union to benefit from the transfer 
of advanced technology? Was the Soviet Union becoming more 
dependent on the West for the import of Western machinery 
and know-how? How great were the gains that the Soviet 
Union made from importing advanced technology from the 
West? 17 
The major constraint on imports to the Soviet Union 
since 1955 is the limitation created by the Soviet's lack of 
hard-currency. As a result of this limitation the flow of 
imports to the Soviet Union has remained small in relation 
to other imputs of Soviet production. Both embodied tech-
nology and technology in the form of licenses and know-how 
22 
have remained small. 18 East-West commercial relations 
throughout the years have always been conducted in an 
atmosphere of caution and hostility as well as enthusiasm 
and often unjustified optimism about the reduction of 
tension and an increase in business trade. 19 
Inorganic and Organic Branches of the Soviet 
Chemical Industry 
The chemical industry of the Soviet Union can be broken 
down into two branches: inorganic chemicals, based on acids 
and alkali; and organic chemicals, which is based on 
petroleum as the feedstock for synthetic materials. The 
transfer of Western technology to these two branches of the 
chemical branch will be discussed below. 
Inorganic Chemical Industry 
The Soviet inorganic chemical industry has performed 
relatively well in terms of total output. This industry 
represents the more traditional and well-established branch 
of the chemical industry. The processes it uses as well as 
the products it turns out have been known for a relatively 
long time. The inorganic chemical industry is made up of 
two groups of chemicals, acids and alkali products. The 
acids include sulphuric, nitric, hydrochloric acid and 
ammonia. The alkali products include soda ash, caustic soda 
and chlorine. These products have enormous applications in 
all branches of the chemical industry. The Soviets have 
23 
successfully scaled up inorganic chemical technology and 
therefore its dependence on imported equipment has been 
minima1. 20 
The Soviet ~nion's inorganic chemical industry has 
performed best when compared with Western countries. The 
volume of soda ash (Na 2co3), a key alkali, produced in the 
Soviet Union is close to the amount produced by the United 
States . . when we look at per capita, a different picture 
occurs. In per capita terms the Soviet Union is still 
behind the United States along with West Germany and France. 
The Soviet Union is also one of the largest producers of 
sulphuric acid, but in per capita terms it still is behind 
many Western European countries and the United States. 21 
In studying the fertilizer production, an area that has 
received considerable priority in the Soviet Union, we find 
that the Soviet Union possesses an extremely rich material 
base. Fertilizers are seen as being one of the ways to help 
improve Soviet agriculture. The Soviet Union can draw upon 
its large natural gas reserves to create nitrogenous fertil-
izers and upon large deposits of apatite and phosphorite to 
create phosphate fertilizers. The Kola peninsula of the 
Soviet Union is the largest source of phosphate in the 
world. The Soviet Union is probably the largest producer of 
superphosphate fertilizers in both absolute and per capita 
terms. In the manufacturing of nitrogenous fertilizers the 
Soviet Union does not do as well. Nitrogenous fertilizers 
24 
require more sophisticated technology, much of which the 
Soviet Union bought from the West. The Soviet Union is 
close to the United States in absolute terms but is behind 
·several West European countries in per capita terms. 22 
The chemical fertilizer industry is the foundation of 
the chemical industry. The Soviet leadership recognized the 
importance of fertilizers, and in March 1965 various resolu-
tions ~were passed by the Central Committee which put the 
official stamp on the change of emphasis in favor of a new 
agricultural policy. The policy called for the implemen-
tation of the following measures: 
a) emphasis on "intensive" methods of stimulating 
output increased by application of fertilizers 
b) a land improvement program of draining humid 
areas and irrigating dry areas 
c) increased investment in agriculture, 
~griculture supp~~ting industries and rural 
infrastructure 
One major agriculture program which required the use of 
fertilizers was the Non-Black-Earth-Zone (NBEZ) of the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. This area 
makes up about one-fifth of the agricultural land in the 
Soviet Union and nearly a quarter of the population. It is 
an area which does not have the best soil quality, is low in 
natural fertilizers, and is high in acidity and water-
logging. The development of the land is needed because it 
is closer ·to the centers of consumption of agriculture and 
agriculture-supporting industries, including the fertilizer 
25 
industry. This zone has a relatively frequent rainfall 
which makes fertilizers fully effective. 24 
Chemical fertilizers are based on four main groups: 
a)phosphatic, b)potash, c)nitrogenous, and d)complex 
fertilizers containing all three main elements. 
TABLE ONE 
AVERAGE YEARLY GROWTH IN FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, IN % 
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 
Fertilizers, total 12.1 10.2 9.65 
Nitrogenous 14.9 9.5 9.65 
Phosphatic 9.4 13.35 14.75 
Potash 11.7 15.75 6.35 
Source: The Transfer of Technology to Socialist Countries 
The growth of phosphatic fertilizers has been growing fast 
because Soviet agronomists believe that phosphatic fertili-
zers need to be increased in relation to nitrogenous fer-
tilizers and potash. Simple phosphatic fertilizers are 
produced mostly by indigenous technology. Domestic tech-
nology has been relied on because the extraction and purif i-
cation of the rock has to be adapted to the specific local 
conditions and therefore cannot be developed abroad. They 
have recently bought several phosphoric acid plants from the 
West to produce more sophisticated fertilizers. 25 
26 
TABLE TWO 
STRUCTURE OF PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, IN % 
Total 
Fertilizers 
Straight Fertilizers 
Single superphosphate 
~riple superphosphate 
Slag 
Complex Fertilizers 
Nitroammophoska 
Ammophos 
Nitrophoska 
Nitrophos 
Nitroammophos 
Crystal in 
Liquid Complex Fertilizers 
Feed Phosphates 
1970 
100.0 
98.7 
86.6 
63.6 
21.3 
1.7 
11.2 
1.5 
3.5 
1.9 
3.1 
1.1 
0.1 
2.2 
1975 
100.0 
92.2 
55.7 
39.5 
15.2 
1.0 
36.5 
2.4 
26.4 
1.6 
2.8 
3.2 
7.8 
1980 
(plan) 
100.0 
90.3 
36.0 
16.0 
19.5 
0.5 
54.5 
11.9 
17.2 
4.0 
2.1 
1.1 
0.3 
7.7 
9.7 
Source: The Transfer of Technology To Socialist Countries 
Potash fertilizer production is also based on 
indigenous technology since it is a relatively simple 
procedure which in many cases has had to be adapted to local 
conditions. Most of the potash is in the form of potassium 
chloride and in recent years the Soviet Union has invited 
Western countries to bid on building a plant with a capacity 
of two million tons per annum of potassium chloride. It is 
too early to tell if this recent development is a 
significant break with traditional policy of using indige-
~ 
nous technology. The production of phosphate and potash 
27 
fertilizers used relatively simple procedures, and the 
Soviets have not had to depend upon imports. 26 
Ammonia is the key item to all nitrogenous fertilizers. 
Ammonia production in the USSR has been heavily dependent 
upon imports from the West. The importance of this product 
is matched by the priority it has enjoyed with regard to 
access to Western imports. To increase nitrogenous fertil-
izer p~oduction a major expansion of ammonia output was 
required, since all nitrogenous fertilizer production is 
based on ammonia as an intermediate. Processes using natu-
ral gas as a feedstock are particularly desired in view of 
their increasing exploitation of natural gas deposits. 
Fertilizers that have high concentrations of nitrogen are 
urea and some complex fertilizers. 27 See Table Three. 
The degree of sophistication of different processes 
used in making nitrogenous fertilizers varies. Technical 
changes in ammonia production have sharply increased the 
optimal size over the last fifteen years. The tanks, tubes, 
and compressors used in large ammonia plants require that 
they meet narrow tolerances. 28 
In the area of complex and concentrated fertilizers the 
dependence on Western technology has been high. This seems 
to substantiate that the more complex the technology, the 
greater the dependence upon Western technology. Prior to 
the launching of the "chemicalization" drive the Soviets 
relied heavily on straight fertilizers, most of which were 
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29 
low quality. The Soviets have depended more on Western 
technology to produce complex fertilizers than the other 
forms. The Soviets are most likely to import complex fer-
ti 1 izer plants in the future because they are a more 
efficient variety of fertilizer. 29 
The raising of Soviet agriculture production and yield 
has been a priority aim of the Soviet economy since Stalin. 
One of~ the major ingredients to help boost agriculture pro-
duction has been the growth of the fertilizer industry. The 
nutrients needed in the soil to support plant growth are 
fixed nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P 2o5 ), and potassium (K 20). 
Intensive agriculture requires that these nutrients be added 
artificially. These nutrients can be delivered in a variety 
of ways. · They are usually delivered in substances which 
have high nutrient content and/or in a combination of the 
nutrients in one fertilizer. The latter type of fertil-
izer in the West is often referred to as a "complex" 
fertilizer. 30 
Soviet development of complex fertilizers has lagged 
behind the West and until the 1960s were not produced at 
all. The main aim of Soviet policy has been to increase the 
supply of concentrated forms of the three primary nutrients 
and to create complex fertilizers containing two or three of 
the nutrients. The Soviet Union has large supplies of the 
raw materials that are required to create these nutrients: 
naptha, coke oven gas or natural gas (for nitrogenous 
30 
fertilizers), apatite (phosphate), and brine deposit and 
syl vinte ores (potash). 31 
Soviet policy-makers in the early 1960s aimed to in-
traduce production of a whole range of products in their 
"chemicalization" drive. In 1960 the Soviet Union produced 
no compound fertilizers, no triple superphosphate and only 
104,000 tons of urea and 136,000 tons of liquid ammonia. 
Their total capacity in 1960 was 17 million tons per annum 
;-
(tpa). At the start of the "chemicalization" drive in 1958, 
the Soviets produced only 14 million tons per annum. The 
1959-1965 Seven-Year Plan predicted that the Soviet Union 
would produce 100 million tons per annum of total fertilizer 
output by 1970. This number was later revised down to 80 
million tons. The Soviet Union would achieve its goal by 
extending capacity at existing plants by 20 million tons per 
annum and building fifty-five new plants: twenty-eight for 
nitrogenous fertilizer; nineteen for phosphate; six for 
potash; and two for phosphate rock. 32 
31 
TABLE FOUR 
PRODUCTION OF CONCENTRATED AND COMPLEX FERTILIZERS 
% SHARE IN TOTAL PRODUCTION 
Fertilizer, total 
Concentrated, total 
nitrogen 
phosphate 
potash 
Complex fertilizers, total 
Share of nutrient content 
in complex fertilizers, % 
nitrogen, N 
phosphorus, P 205 potassium, K2o 
1970 
100.0 
61.1 
29.8 
4.6 
26.7 
4.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1975 
100.0 
65.2 
27.9 
4.0 
33.3 
13.0 
4.5 
8.1 
2.3 
1980 
(plan) 
100.0 
62.0 
27.6 
7.2 
27.2 
30.0 
7.8 
14.8 
4.2 
Source: The Transfer of Technology to Socialist Countries 
The Soviet Union could have developed the chemical 
industry by itself or with the aid of other Eastern Bloc 
countries, but this would have been more costly. The fer-
tilizer industry in the West had to solve production prob-
lems of urea which were not solved until the 1950s. The 
maximum size of ammonia plants, which is usually the optimum 
size, has been increasing rapidly since the 1960s. The 
Kellogg process, which is used in the manufacturing of 
complex fertilizers, has become very important and today is 
responsible for over half of the ammonia output. The 
processes of complex fertilizers are sophisticated and 
evolving rapidly. Many of the technological changes that 
32 
are taking place are not great changes but they have an 
economic impact which is considerable. These changes in 
technology are "occurring in areas where Soviet applied 
research and development was especially backwards." 33 The 
potential gains from trade through imports of Western ma-
chinery and know-how has been strong. The Soviet Union has 
used Western machinery and know-how to become the largest 
producer of mineral fertilizers, but utilization of chemical 
fertilizers has lagged behind the West. 34 
A lag of about three years occurs between placing an 
order and completion of installation for ammonia plants. 
This is less time than for most other types of chemical 
plants. In the late 1970s half of the Soviet ammonia 
output was created in Western-designed plants. The Soviets 
rely upon the West because there is a high savings obtained 
by using the Kellogg and Chemico large-plant processes. The 
high costs and difficulty for the Soviet engineer and East 
European design engineer and manufacturers of replicating 
existing Western plants makes it less expensive for them to 
import plants, especially when Western contractors compete 
to supply the plants on favorable terms. 35 
The gains from trade involved in ammonia plant imports 
come from technology transfer based on the detailed design 
engineering expertise of Western specialists and plant con-
struction. The basic technology underlying the plant design 
is contained in the Kellogg and Chemico ammonia processes. 
33 
The Soviets, in this instance, are not as much interested in 
buying fundamental know-how as they are in receiving the 
more empirical and experience-based expertise of the spe-
cialist contractors and the detailed design work from 
Kellogg and Chemico. In some of the contracts Soviet orga-
nizations participate in the design and/or assembly work 
which presumably helps them to learn. 36 
The Soviets may still be dependent on the West for 
large imported ammonia plants as a result of weakness in the 
Soviet metallurgy and metal-working capabilities. The 
Soviet production of wide-diameter pipe is small and the 
pipe is · necessary. The relevant skills, know-how, and manu-
facturing capabilities probably are in the Soviet Union but 
are used in the defense sector. 37 
In the complex fertilizer production, imported tech-
nology was of vital importance, 13.9 percent of the total 
fertilizer output was in the form of complex fertilizers in 
the 1970s. There was little indigenous . research and 
development by the Soviets of complex fertilizers and almost 
all of the production came from imported plants. The output 
of the Soviets' complex fertilizers, according to Hanson, 
for Western-built plants were operating at about seventy-
five percent capacity. 38 
Thirty percent of the Soviet fertilizer output planned 
for 1980 was to be complex· fertilizers. They planned to 
create eight to 10 million tons of nutrients. This meant 
34 
that Western plants were expected to continue to produce the 
great bulk of complex fertilizers. 39 
Organic Chemical Industry 
The ~odern chemical industry depends upon heavy organic 
chemistry, the production of essential feedstocks to manu-
facture synthetic materials and other organic end-products. 
Many of these industrial processes are based upon petroleum 
i" 
and have only become widely diff.used since the end of the 
Second World War. This form of chemistry requires special 
technology and the extent to which a country can assimilate 
these technologies, the more developed the chemical industry 
must be. The Soviet Union produces less than half the 
amount that the United States produces. It is difficult to 
determine how successful the Soviet Union has been in this 
area because it does not regularly release this information. 
The Soviet Union does not release the structure of the raw 
material base comprising oil, coal, natural gas and other 
sources that are used in the manufacture of the chemicals. 
The absence of satisfactory production figures suggests that 
the manufacture of heavy organic chemicals in the Soviet 
Union may not be as highly involved as the West. 40 
The Soviet Union was slow iri switching to a petroleum-
based chemical industry. It was more dependent on coal and 
fermentation as its main sources of organic chemicals. The 
Soviet Union was slower to switch to petroleum-based 
chemicals because the petrochemical industry was relatively 
35 
neglected. The petrochemical industry was neglected due to 
underdeveloped technology and perhaps to reconcile the 
priorities that belong to petrole~m products, should it be 
used as a fuel source or for organic chemistry. 41 
Source: 
TABLE FIVE 
THE PROPORTION OF SYNTHETICS IN TOTAL OUTPUT 
OF MANMADE FIBERS (%) 
1950 1960 1965 1970 
USSR 5.4 7.1 18.9 26.8 
USA 8.9 39.7 53.8 72.3 
FRG 0.5 18.5 39.2 68.8 
Japan 0.4 21.4 43.2 66.3 
UK 2.5 22.7 37.8 56.3 
France 2.0 27.4 40.1 57.2 
The Technological Level of Soviet Industry 
, In areas where the Soviet Union has had high techno-
logical skills they have been able to learn from Western 
technology at a high rate. In areas where they are lagging 
and the Soviets have imported large amounts of foreign 
technology, their learning ability has been poor. "High-
technology imports have not visibly improved the Soviets' 
ability to innovate on their own, in some instances the 
opposite has occurred." 42 The reason for such poor 
absorption lies in part with the political and economic 
structure of the Soviet Union. There have been several 
attempts at reforms by the Soviet Union but with little 
effects. 43 Attempts to control high-technology of 
36 
non-military related technology and erect barriers of trade 
between the West and the Soviet Union have been attempted. 
"The most effective barriers to technology transfer are 
those erected by the Soviets against themsel ves."44 
The Soviet Union's che.mical industry has pursued a 
program of massive imports of equipment and technology 
especially in the areas of _synthetic fibers, plastics, and 
synthetic rubber. The Soviet Union's dependence is so great 
,. 
.in areas of complex synthetic material that Western equip-
ment accounts for two-thirds of their entire output of 
polyethylene, polypropylene, polyester fiber, and acrylic 
fibers. The Soviet Union has had a rapid growth in the 
number of engineers and scientists trained in chemistry in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet Union has also increased 
its number of chemistry research institutes during these 
years. Even with the rapid growth in the number of people 
trained in chemistry and the increase in research insti-
tutes, the Soviet Union has continued to be reliant on 
Western imports. This reliance on imports has inhibited the 
growth of indigenous Soviet research and the development of 
newer branches of chemistry. 45 
The transfer of technology in the chemistry industry 
has not been enough to give the Soviet Union an independent 
innovative capability that can contribute to further ad-
vances in the chemical industry. The importation of 
technology in the chemical industry may even have retarded 
37 
the growth of Soviet capabilities. Only further continued 
reliance on continued imports will enable the advance sector 
of the chemical industry to continue to progress at its 
present rate. 46 
The Soviet Union imported foreign technology in an 
attempt to rapidly catch up with the West. The ability of 
the Soviet scientists and engineers has depended more upon 
the lev~l they already had achieved before the massive 
arrival of foreign imports than upon the new technology they 
imported. This has led to the Soviets' stagnation and 
continued dependence because they rely more on foreign im-
ports than on their own innovators. 47 
Studies of the Soviet Chemical Industry 
Philip Hanson's Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western 
Relations looks at the chemical industry in the Soviet Union 
and how Western technology transfer has affected it. Hanson 
interviewed the executives of seven British chemical and 
chemical plant companies in 1978. The companies' contracts 
with the Soviet Union ranged from the late 1950s to the mid 
1970s. Twenty-seven of the thirty-two contracts were for 
turnkey projects, either for totally new plants or for an 
addition to an existing chemical ·plant. 48 
The survey found the negotiations of the main con-
tract normally to be a difficult exercise. Usually the 
specialist plant contractor was working for a chemical 
company which was the licensor of the process plant to be 
38 
built. The contractor usually coordinates machinery 
deliveries from different equipment manufacturers. Many of 
the projects have unique features which require extensive 
detail design engineering for the specific project. The 
delivery of the equipment is phased over a long period of 
time and, thereafter, the delivery and . installation phases 
commonly overlap. The contracts require the chemical 
companies to perform design, supply, supervisory erection 
and commissioning of the new plant. This means that the 
company work is not finished until the plant is commissioned 
and handed over to the Soviet government. The commissioning 
of the plant is a major, multi-~tage procedure involving 
checking of installed equipment, test runs of parts of the 
plant, debugging, and minimum-load testing of full-cycle 
operation before the first full test run. These systemic 
and procedural factors affect the lead-times and other 
aspects of assimilation substantially. 49 
The lead-time of the twenty-six turnkey projects in the 
survey, on the average, was six years and ten months. These 
types of projects in the West would take about two and one-
quarter to three and one-half years, this meant that it took 
three and one-half to four years longer to complete the 
plants in the Soviet Union. 50 
Once the company handed over the operation of the 
completed plant the manning level was found to be higher 
than most European levels. The excess in manning levels was 
39 
from fifty percent to seventy percent. The output levels on 
a completed plant after it was handed over in some cases had 
fallen below levels that had been guaranteed. In the cases 
of nine plants it was found that they were operating below 
the guaranteed level, and four plants were above the 
guaranteed output. 5l 
The respondents almost universally agreed that the 
Soviet initial inquiries were vague and unspecific. For 
this reason, many companies did not recognize that a request 
had been made. The Soviet requirements for detailed design 
documentation were regarded as extremely heavy and so were 
details for operating procedures. This resulted in a body 
of operating instructions about four times bulkier than it 
would be in the West. 52 
Contractors thought that the Soviet inspection of 
equipment in Britain before its acceptance for shipping to 
the USSR was rigorous and on some occasions excessive. 
Given the constraints of Soviet shipping schedules and port 
facilities, it was felt that on some occasions little 
quibbles had delayed deliveries. The Soviets insisted that 
at least eight percent of the equipment should be delivered 
and on the site before the assembly .and installation could 
begin. This meant that the delivery and installation phases 
overlapped much more than in the West. There were some 
cases where the plant location was moved, and on other 
occasions related plants were not brought into operation, 
40 
therefore delaying operations. Delays in construction work 
were common and the labor force would fluctuate unpredict-
ably. The skill of the labor was found to be low by 
Western standards.S3 
The respondents· drew attention to one or more of the 
negative influences of the Soviet assimilative capacity: 
slow decision-making; the concern for slow decision-making; 
the concern for Soviet officials to guarantee themselves 
r 
against any possibility of being held responsible in case of 
failure; a general lack of entrepreneurship; and a persis-
tent tendency to overm~nning which many respondents thought 
was imposed on unwilling managers by Party-state machine on 
"we 1 fare" grounds. S 4 
The assimilation of Western technology by the Soviets 
that came out in the survey showed that assimilation took 
longer than in West European countries in the case of the 
chemical industry. In the case of chemical technology, 
there was no sign of a systematic reduction in lead-time 
with experience and manning levels on the high side while 
output was less than expected. The successful domestic 
diffusion and modification of the chemical industry appeared 
to be limited.SS The plants in the survey, though, got into 
production and stayed in production and in some cases have 
been operating well by Western standards. Western imports 
have transformed large parts of the chemical industry so it 
41 
could produce a wide range of important products and there-
fore some diffusion has occurred. 56 
The executives interviewed saw domestic priority 
ranking as the major influence on the speed and efficiency 
of assimilation. Large projects that required large hard-
currency output were usually assigned high domestic pri-
ority, but this did not mean that the project retained a 
certain priority ranking. It was found that industrial 
branches such as the chemical industry, which were addicted 
to Western imported machinery, were able to get substantial 
plant and know-how orders included in the hard-currency 
import plan as a matter of routine. These plants did not 
always carry a high domestic priority. The evidence showed 
that the average lead-time for import intensive projects was 
less than for indigenous projects in the chemical industry. 
This may have been because of the superior supply and coor-
dination skills of Western contractors, but it may also have 
been that a higher domestic priority was given to imported 
plants than to domestic plants. 57 
Hanson looked at other studies on the Soviet chemical 
industry. He found that, in a study by Sominskii and others 
on 132 chemical projects, the results showed that projects 
using domestic research and development tended to take 
fifteen years. The total lead-time for a first time pro-
ject, from research, development, testing, and evaluation 
through assimilation was five years longer for domestic 
42 
plants as compared to imported Western plants.5 8 Martens 
and Young's study found that Soviet indigenous inventions in 
the technical area of chemistry had the longest implemen-
tation lead-time of eighteen technical areas. Martens and 
Young found two interpretations of the role of Western 
technology. One was that Western imports were advantageous 
because they reduced lead-times that would be much greater 
in their absence. The second interpretation was that in the 
~ 
long run a continuous heavy reliance upon Western imported 
technology has caused the Soviet Union to give domestic 
research and development ·a low priority, which caused it to 
have a low performance. This has caused the Soviet chemical 
industry to remain dependent on the West for innovative 
technology. 59 
Thane Gustafson's Selling the Russians the Rope? 
Soviet Technology Policy and U.S. Export Controls studied 
several Soviet industries including the chemical industry. 
Gustafson studied the research and development ability of 
the Soviet chemical industry. The research and development 
method that he studied was the scientific-production 
association (naucho-proizvodstvennoe ob'edinenie or NPO) 
which is patterned after Soviet observations of American 
high-technology corporations. 60 
One of the best known NPOs, Plastpolimer, is a 
Leningrad-based chemical association and is a model for 
other chemical institutes to follow. Plastpolimer is the 
44 
production facilities. This meant that Okhtinsk was forced 
to displace old production techniques and stop production 
while retraining and retooling took place. This caused 
serious management problems because Okhtinsk continued to 
have to meet its production targets. The two companies were 
told to work together but were both given different pro-
auction targets. These problems continued for three years 
until the local district off ice of the Party apparatus 
r 
picked a strong chairman, Mr. Popov, to run Plastpolimer. 
Popov was a former director of the design bureau that had 
become part of Plastpolimer. Popov lobbied for greater 
cooperation between the two units but met resistance from 
the local Party hierarchy. The district off ice of the Party 
defended Popov for his innovative procedures. The Okhtinsk 
plant's production targets were brought more in line with 
the objectives of Plastpolimer but not completely. Okhtinsk 
continued to produce plastic toys but other obsolete pro-
ducts were cut. By late 1979 only forty-three percent of 
Okhtinsk production output consisted of thermoplastics, 
which is what Plastpolimer was designed to make. 
Plastpolimer by Soviet standards was considered to be one of 
the leaders in its fiela. 62 
The General Director Z.N. Poliakov sounded discouraged 
in 1979, complaining that Plastpolimer's performance was 
based on · the success of meeting monthly and quarterly output 
plans, just like any other industrial plant. Plastpolirner, 
45 
though, was designed for research. Having to meet produc-
tion targets turned his job into an ordinary enterprise 
director, and research scientists into production supervi-
sors. This reduced the scientists' ability to adapt and 
learn from foreign technology and to move beyond it, and 
generate their own. Plastpolimer and other facilities like 
it were designed to be dedicated to the task of innovation 
and to a~similate foreign technology, that is, its ideas and 
know-how rather than to produce finished products. 63 
Plastpolimer has not been able to move beyond Western 
technology or even able to duplicate it without Western 
assistance. The reason Plastpolimer has not developed 
strong independent capacities might be the result of policy 
choices made by the ministry. Another reason might be that 
the cost of Western technology has been more attractive than 
domestic development. 64 
Gustaf son believes that NPOs can succeed if they become 
"truly integrated units and be able to influence the later 
stages of the innovation cycle, 1165 but that NPOs do not 
have the necessary high-level of support needed to achieve 
their potential.66 Once NPOs are established they end up 
being loaded down with output plans and heavy production 
targets. The result is that NPOs no longer are research 
institutes because production becomes more important than 
research and development. 67 
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Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper and R.W. Davies' The 
Technological Level of Soviet Industry found that the soviet 
Union trailed well behind the Western countries in the 
creation of synthetic materials. The Soviet's plastic in-
dustry has expanded rapidly and has caught up some, but what 
is truly peculiar about plastic industry is the continued 
growth of the traditional plastics and resins. The Soviet 
Union ha~ followed a pattern of remaining dependent on non-
polymerised raw materials. In Western countries polymerised 
materials make up well over half of the synthetic fiber 
output, while in the Soviet Union, polymerised materials 
make up only one third of the synthetic fiber output. 69 In 
the early 1970s the Soviet chemical fibers industry was 
still dominated by the viscose process, which was assimi-
lated during the inter war period. 70 
Since the Second World War the Soviet Union has become 
the second largest producer of chemicals. The Soviets' 
chemical industry has grown quickly but it is also because 
the Soviets have increased inorganic chemicals and fertili-
zers, but not so rapidly as in plastics and fibers. The 
Soviets have made rapid progress in the traditional chemical 
industry, but its performance in tne more sophisticated 
field has been less impressive. 71 See Table Six. 
Most Western nations are net exporters of chemical 
plants and chemical products, especially in areas that 
require sophisticated technology. The Soviet Union is an 
TA
BL
E 
SI
X
 
' 
PR
O
D
U
CT
IO
N
 
OF
 
M
AJ
OR
 
TY
PE
S 
OF
 
CH
EM
IC
A
L 
OU
TP
UT
 
(U
NI
TS
 I
N
 
TH
OU
SA
ND
S 
OF
 
M
ET
RI
C 
TO
NS
 
EX
CE
PT
 W
HE
N 
IN
D
IC
A
TE
D
) 
19
71
 
19
73
 
19
75
 
19
77
 
S
y
n
th
et
ic
 R
es
in
 
a
n
d 
P
la
st
ic
 M
as
se
s 
1
,8
6
4
 
2
,2
3
0
 
2
,8
42
 
3
,3
0
9
 
M
in
er
al
 
F
e
rt
il
iz
e
r 
T
o
ta
l 
M
il
li
o
n
s 
o
f 
T
on
s 
6 1
 .. 
4 
7
2
.3
 
90
.2
 
96
 .. 
8 
A
rt
if
ic
ia
l 
a
n
d 
S
y
n
th
et
ic
 
F
ib
er
 T
o
ta
l 
67
6.
4 
83
0.
0 
95
5.
0 
10
88
.0
 
A
rt
if
ic
ia
l 
F
ib
er
 
47
3.
3 
54
3.
0 
59
0.
0 
62
9.
0 
S
y
n
th
et
ic
 F
ib
er
 
20
3.
0 
28
7.
0 
36
5.
0 
45
9.
0 
S
ou
rc
e:
 
T
he
 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 
L
ev
el
 
o
f 
th
e 
S
o
v
ie
t 
U
ni
on
 
~
 
-
.
.
.
.
.
J 
48 
importer of chemical plants and chemical products except in 
the inorganic chemicals and simple fertilizers.72 The 
fertilizer industry is the Soviet Union's only major branch 
in the chemical industry to be a net exporter and have a 
trade surplus. Even in this area though, the Soviet Union 
tends to export simple fertilizers and minerals and import 
more sophisticated agricultural chemicals. 73 
The ~oviet Union is a net exporter of basic organic and 
inorganic acids, coke chemicals, and wood chemicals due 
largely to its trade with Eastern Europe and many Third 
World countries. These exports are not enough to off set the 
substantial imports of alkalis, plastics, and other chemical 
products. The Soviet Union remains dependent upon imports 
of chemical products, especially those requiring tech-
nologically advanced manufacturing processes. There has 
been a steady upward trend in the proportion of chemical 
products in the total trade with the West. 74 
The Soviet Union is a substantial net importer of 
chemical plants and equipment and therefore depends on 
foreign countries to increase its technology in the chemical 
industry. In the 1960s, foreign plants were responsible for 
over one-third of the chemical equipment introduced into the 
Soviet economy. The Soviet Union imports from both East 
Europe and the west. The Soviet Union imported large and 
expensive chemical plants and equipment from the West in the 
1960s, which produced technologically sophisticated products 
49 
such as, petrochemical intermediates, plastics, agricultural 
chemicals, pesticides, complex fabrication, and man-made 
fibers. 75 
Soviet dependence upon the West for new technology in 
the chemical industry raises two intriguing questions: 
"Whether the Soviet Union will be in a permanently weak 
position in terms of its ability to catch up with the West 
in chemical technology; and how competitive its end products 
are. 1176 Western engineers who have worked on Soviet con-
struction projects believe that imports of Western plants in 
themselves will not be sufficient to allow the Soviets to 
close the technological gap. Many Western firms bring 
everything into the Soviet Union and the Soviets have little 
to do with the building of a plant. This means that the 
plant is functional but there is little learned about the 
building of a plant by the Soviet Union. This means that it 
will take the Soviet Union longer to master the technology 
and when they have, the United States and the other Western 
countries will have moved on to more sophisticated pro-
ducts. 77 "The lesson here seems to be that the technology 
gap in chemical processes can only be narrowed by a native 
research and development effort culminating in successful 
innovation, which rapidly builds upon assimilated Western 
know-how. 1178 "On the second point, competiveness in the 
manufacture of end-products, there seems little doubt that 
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the innovating country enjoys considerable advantages in the 
short and medium term. 1179 
There has been a considerable output of scientific 
research by the Soviets, but the quality of their research 
work does not have the same impact as Western works. "The 
Soviet research effort does not seem to have generated any 
really important and original innovations, which could be 
successfully scaled up to mass production. 1180 Most chemists 
r 
believe that Soviet chemical research contains quality work 
comparable to Western works, but this work is usually buried 
in with inferior quality material. 81 
The Soviet Union is a country often depicted as being 
cut off from the main information stream of the world. 
Science, and therefore the Soviet Union suffers loses in the 
circulation of ideas. The Soviet scientists' lack of direct 
contact with their Western counterparts has been a problem. 
The language barrier has been an obstacle to communication 
at times, but its impact should not be exaggerated. 82 
Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper's Industrial Innovation 
in the Soviet Union finds that laboratory research plays a 
major role in the chemical industry in the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union tends to allocate tne largest share of 
resources to research rather than to development. Unlike 
other industries where designs are based on already existing 
components, and therefore the development stage is most 
important, the chemical industry must deal with chemical 
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processes that are based on substances and/or reaction whose 
properties are not known in detail. Laboratory experiments 
are required to select the end product which is most 
favorable. 83 
Fundamental research is the first stage and it can be 
divided into two groups, theoretical research and explor-
atory or mission-oriented research. Theoretical research 
hopes to f~nd new chemical principles and its practical 
applications. Exploratory research is concerned with the 
systematic screening of substances. In Soviet research 
institutes, the ratio between theoretical and exploratory 
research in chemistry is roughly one to three. 84 
Applied research follows from fundamental research and 
it is concerned about the detailed elaboration, on labora-
tory equipment, of the optimal variant of the process which 
has been established theoretically during the first phase. 
Applied research absorbs a higher proportion of research and 
development resources in the chemical industry than in any 
other science-based industry. 85 
In Western countries the chemical contractors combine 
responsibility for design and construction, but in the 
Soviet Union they are handled by different groups. The 
construction of a Soviet chemical plant is carried out by 
organizations that are subordinate to the Union-republic 
ministers of construction. Then the plant is officially 
accepted for start-up by a state commission of experts 
52 
appointed by the Ministry for the Chemical Industry. In the 
Soviet Union, the start-up and modification of the new plant 
is undertaken by a special State Engineering-Technical Trust 
in association with the capital project institutes on whose 
design the plant had been based. 8 6 
Once a plant is completed and handed over to its new 
management the lengthy process of assimilation begins. For 
the research-production cycle, the assimilation phase is 
I' 
where they prove if they have accomplished their task. The 
new management often has to face the fact that the design 
estimates of the plant's performance were exaggerated. Once 
a plant is brought on stream and has reached planned capac-
ity, the cost and quality considerations tend to disappear 
from the scene. The first stage of assimilaton is governed 
by Gosplan regulations, the other phases are not. To reach 
capacity usually takes a plant, on average, 2.65 years, and 
can drag on longer if the plant is accepted prematurely by 
the ministry. 87 
In the Soviet Union the assimilation period is divided 
into three stages: a) the period of start-up and adjustment; 
b) the achievement of planned capacity; c) the achievement 
of cost and quality parameters. Soviet data shows that the 
first phase lasted from one and one-half months to one to 
1.5 years, the second phase required one to 1.5 years and 
the last phase requires one to 1.5 years. The average 
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assimilation time for the Soviet Union is approximately 
three years. 88 
The time taken to build a chemical plant, on average, 
is from five to seven years and in some instances has taken 
ten years. In Britain and the United States the average 
time for a large chemical plant is one or two years below 
the Soviet average. · Considering that on technological and 
other reasons, the economically useful lifetime of a 
... 
chemical plant in the West is estimated between ten and 
eighteen years, it is clear t hat unplanned construction 
delays is a major factor in holding back the introduction 
and diffusion of new technology. In terms of the prevailing 
levels of technology, the Soviet's chemical plant can be 
obsolete before it comes on stream. 89 
There are many reasons which can be considered that 
produce the sluggish performance. The first reason is that 
frequent changes in design appear to be endemic during the 
final phases of the research and production cycle. These 
changes increase costs and drag out the construction period. 
Many of t h e problems are caused by inaccuracies and mistakes 
in drawings which are the failures to remove bugs from the 
process during the development stage. The resulting delays 
can only lead to obsolescence which can only be slowed down 
by further modification and delays. When this occurs then 
the original design is often changed radically from the 
original design. Other problems stem from the fact that 
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construction work of new chemical plants comes under a host 
of construction and assembly organizations. Only eight to 
twelve percent of the work is carried out by organizations 
directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Chemical 
Industry. This can cause problems such as machinery 
arriving on the site too early and being left to rust 
because there are no buildings, drains are laid after the 
erection o~ buildings are underway, or equipment is supplied 
that cannot be used. 90 Instead of using one main contractor 
who assumes overall responsibility, the new enterprise must 
deal with hundreds of individual suppliers who are not 
coordinated to deliver supplies when needed. 91 
In recent years the Soviet chemical industry resources 
have been equal to or a little less than the research and 
development resources of the United States. The main prob-
lem for the Soviet Union lies in the organizational and 
economic framework within which the resources are deployed. 
Many of their problems have come from the absence of stimu-
lus for innovation. The industrial enterprises are guided 
by a central plan which sets success criteria, which have 
tended to breed conservative attitudes, and these attitudes 
are difficult to change. The central planners are forced to 
be responsible for changes because the lower administrative 
levels refuse to be responsible. The conservative attitudes 
of enterprise and the ambivalent attitude of the ministry 
towards research and development has caused fragmentation of 
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the research-production cycle. The widespread problems of 
the design and construction stages also are major problems 
of reaching the rapid introduction of research and develop-
ment results into production.9 2 
The relations between research institutes and indus-
trial enterprises has been troublesome. The people and 
institutes that are supposed to co9rdinate and direct scien-
tific and technical progress either have no money, no power, 
or no courage. It is therefore difficult to overcome 
administrative barriers the more complex the project. 
Lacking real power over the implementation of policy the 
ministers instead exert petty tutelage over the details of 
the disbursement of funds.93 
The priority level of the Soviet chemical industry in 
resources has remained high over the last several decades. 
The ability of the Soviet Union to catch up with the West 
will depend on how effective its research and development 
system can work. It is popular in Western writings to show 
that economic reforms have not succeeded in fully developing 
a research and development system in the Soviet Union, and 
therefore, economic reforms will continue to fail. "Thus 
massive purchases of Western plant ~nd equipment or funda-
mental systemic changes are thought to be the only viable 
. k d .. 94 escape routes from technological bac war ness. If the 
Soviet Union hopes to keep up with the West it must deal 
effectively with its research and development system. 95 
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CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
The Soviet Union's petroleum industry is important to 
the country's economy. The petroleum industry is one of the 
Soviet Union's major energy suppliers and has grown rapidly 
since the late 1950s. The petroleum industry is also impor-
tant because it is a m_ajor earner of hard currency which the 
Soviets need to continue to build their industrial base and 
for agricultural products. The export of petroleum is 
responsible for almost fifty percent of all Soviet hard 
currency earnings . 1 
History of Soviet Petroleum Industry 
Russia was a major oil exporter by the 1880s. Large 
oil discoveries were discovered in Baku in the early 1870s, 
production increased quickly and Russia soon became Standard 
Oil's main competitor in the 1880s. Russia was the largest 
producer of petroleum in the world between 1898 and 1902. 
The high point for Russia was in 1901 when pre-revolutionary 
Russian production was reached. Russian oil production did 
not reach that point again until 1929. 2 
Russia tried to deal with its lagging oil production by 
drilling new wells and by exploring new areas outside of the 
Baku region. In addition foreigners were allowed to come 
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into Russia bringing needed capital and technology. New oil 
drilling equipment was brought in to replace the old wooden 
drills with modern metal tools. It was difficult to drill 
more than 300 feet using a wooden drill, but it was possible 
to drill deeper wells using metal equipment. Wells could be 
drilled to 600 yards using metal equipment.3 
Russian production continued to decline in part due to 
the failur~ of Russian companies to import enough new tech-
nology. Refining and drilling techniques were rapidly 
changing in the early part of the twentieth century, and few 
Russian companies were able to keep up. Russian oil com-
panies were caught up in the international corporate 
scheming and rivalry of the period. Price-cutting was a 
common tactic of the day and many producers cut back on 
their operations, and others went bankrupt. 4 
Most damaging was the labor and civil unrest which hit 
the Baku and Batum areas. Oil worker strikes occurred every 
year between 1901 and 1905. What the strikers did not burn 
or pillage, a reactionary group calling itself the Black 
Hundred did. The complex racial mixture of Tartars, 
Armenians, Jews, Russians, and Moslem Turks in the area did 
not help the tranquility of the area~ In 1905, revolution 
caused overall production to fall over 3 million tons and 
for exports to be cut in half. 5 
In 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution had an immediate 
impact on oil production as oil production fell from 10.8 
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million tons in 1916, to 8.8 million tons in 1917. This was 
caused by worker unrest and their insistence on more control 
over managerial decision-making. On June 6, 1918, formal 
confiscation of the oil fields was declared. This led to 
production falling even further to 4.1 million tons that 
year. 6 
In September 1918, the Turkish occupation of the Baku 
region occurred, which provided an opening that many old 
I" 
investors had been waiting for. In November 1918, the 
British pushed the Turks out of the Baku area and attempted 
to set up an independent state of Azerbaidzham. This was 
not soley an anti-Bolshevik scheme, but an anti-Russian step 
to help protect Persia and India. In May of 1920, the 
Bolsheviks retook the Baku area. 7 
The Bolsheviks had physical control of the area but 
they soon discovered they did not have the technical nor 
managerial skills of the foreigners or others who had 
operated the oil fields. Output levels continued to fall 
until it reached its low point of only 3.781 million tons in 
1921, (a level not seen since 1889~) 8 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) authorized extending 
concessions to foreign companies. The Barnsdall Corporation 
was the first to sign an agreement to help rebuild Soviet 
oil production in October 1921. Other Western companies 
followed and signed concession agreements. The new tech-
nology helped increase production. Advanced rotary drills 
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and deep well pumps were brought in and by 1924 production 
was up to 7 million tons. Besides work on wells, foreign 
help gave assistance to the building of a second pipeline 
from Baku to Batum. The French supplied the Schumberger 
well-logging process and the American, German, and British 
helped build refineries. With the Western assistance, pro-
auction grew quickly and by 1930 production reached 22 
million tons.9 
After the Second World War foreign help was called in 
to help reconstruct both oil fields and refineries. Most of 
the Soviet effort was directed at the reconstruction of the 
Baku area. The war, though, had a lasting effect on the 
area and it never reached its pre-war high. The Soviets 
gradually began to move toward the Volga-Urals region. Oil 
had been discovered in this region in 1929, but had not been 
exploited. The Volga-Urals area output rose rapidly after 
the Second World War and by 1949, was out-producing the Baku 
region. 10 
The Volga-Urals region's growth raised the Soviet Union 
to the second largest producer of oil in 1961, ahead of 
Venezuela and behind the United States. By the mid-1960s, 
the region was accounting for seventy-two to seventy-three 
percent of Soviet total production. The percentage of oil 
produced for the Soviet Union in the Volga-Urals region 
started to decline in 1965 as West Siberia was opened . 
. 
Absolute production for the Volga-Urals region reached its 
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peak in 1975, and has steadily decreased over the last ten 
years. 11 
As the Volga-Urals started to decline, the West Siberia 
fields came into full production. During the Five-Year Plan 
1971-1975, the development of West Siberian fields was 
dominated by an upsurge of production at the supergiant 
Samotlor. Soviet planners have found it easier and more 
efficient tp concentrate their development on a single 
place. With the start of production in 1969, production at 
Samotlor had jumped by 10 million tons in 1970, to 86.5 
million in 1975, and has leveled off at 130 to 140 million 
tons. The production of Samotlor during the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan 1971-1975 represented sixty-six percent of the pro-
duction increase in West Siberia and fifty-five percent for 
the entire Soviet Union. 12 
Samotlor was a rare find and Soviet planners have had 
to start bringing in smaller fields to maintain incremental 
output. Development has concentrated on the immediate 
vicinity of the Ob' River, which is the main transportation 
route during the ice-free summer shipping season. The two 
main oil towns of Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk have grown from 
isolated Siberian villages to urban centers of 60,000 to 
70,000 population in the last two decades. 13 
Transportation has been a major problem for these 
cities. Railroads and pipelines ·are the major forms of 
transportation in these areas. Construction has been 
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difficult because of the conditions in the remote northern 
swamps and the need to bring in ballast and other roadbed 
materials from distant quarries.14 
The high cost of construction has kept construction and 
development down, and so Soviet planners have kept the 
building of permanent settlements to a minumum. They have 
used the work-shift method, in which oil production workers 
are ferried by helicopter from a base city like Surgut or 
f' 
Nizhnevartovsk to the isolated drilling sites where they 
work for one or two weeks in makeshift dormitory settlements 
before returning for an off period to their permanent place 
of residence. This has worked reasonably well as long as 
they are close to a permanent city, but development is being 
pushed further eastward and there is talk of building a 
permanent city near the Kholmogory field. The Soviets have 
continued to search for oil in more remote places, building 
cities and transportation as they are needed. 15 
Until the Second World War, most of the gas produced 
was either gas that came from the production of petroleum as 
a by-product or gas derived from the gasification of coal. 
During this time firewood was often a more important source 
of fuel than gas. The realization t0at gas was an important 
fuel source led to important changes after the Second World 
War. During the war large fields were discovered in the 
Volga-Urals, the Caucasus and Shebelinka in the central 
Ukraine. Not until the mid-1950s did the output of gas from 
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gas fields exceed gas derived as a by-product. The dis-
coveries iri Ukraine led to other finds in the Soviet Union. 
As new gas fields were discovered, the gas derived from the 
petroleum industry became a smaller percentage of total 
production. By the mid-1950s, it made up less than one-half 
of the total production. When the potential for gas was 
finally realized, a network of gas pipelines was built, so 
gas could be transported and become an important export 
~ 
commodity to Eastern Europe and Western Europe. By 1979, 
the Soviet Union was thought to hold 39.9 percent of the 
world's gas reserves. 16 
Phases of the Soviet Petroleum Industry 
The Soviet petroleum industry can be broken into six 
phases: exploration, drilling, production and enhanced 
recovery, refining, offshore activities, and transportation. 
The transfer of technology in these six phases is explored 
below. 
Exploration, Seismic Work 
The Soviet Union has relatively few people who have the 
skills to use advance exploration techniques. This, along 
with an inadequate stock of advanced . technological equipment 
has handicapped the Soviets in their exploration for new oil 
and natural gas deposits. 17 The exploration of oil and gas 
usually takes place in three phases: regional surveys that 
identify possible geological locations where hydrocarbons 
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may be found; detailed geophysical surveys that evaluate 
prospective sites that are found during regional surveys; 
and exploratory drillings that test the findings of the 
regional surveys and the geophysical surveys.18 
Western observers believe that the Soviets possess an 
adequate domestic capability to perform regional surveys, 
but the domestic equipment they use to perform detailed 
geophysica~ surveys is of comparatively low quality. The 
equipment is bulky, difficult to transport and inferior in 
its accuracy. The Soviet equipment has been adequate in the 
past, but as the Soviets have to explore for oil at 
increasing depths they will need higher quality seismic 
equipment. 19 
Geophysical exploration relies heavily on computers, 
and, therefore, the Soviets have turned to the West for 
computers, related software, and equipment. The Soviets 
have made major purchases of Western computer equipment 
because it can be purchased in complete ready-to-use sets. 
The Soviet Union detailed seismic work is still dependent on 
traditional analog methods of analysis. The analog method 
provides good results, but these cannot be easily subjected 
to further processing, as can be done on more efficient 
digital computers. The sale of Western computers to the 
Soviet Union has played an important role in aiding the 
Soviets to collect and ~rocess digital seismic data 
efficiently.20 
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The Soviets do produce computers but they are 
"essentially functional duplicates of IBM models."21 The 
Soviets design their computers after Western computers to 
minimize design decisions and to be able to use Western 
software. Software has long been a problem for the Soviets 
and is an area in which they are extremely weak. The 
reasons they are weak in this area is largely systemic. 22 
"The Soviet economy is simply not structured to facilitate -
, 
indeed, even to allow - the close and constant interaction 
between users and suppliers which is necessary to the 
implementation of appropriate software. 1123 The system users 
are unable to communicate with the scientists, designers, 
and theoreticians. 2 4 
Through the purchases of Western equipment the Soviets 
have acquired advanced techniques. These new techniques 
have allowed the Soviets to move ahead quickly, but these 
are techniques that were current in the West in 1975. Since 
1975, technology in the Western computer industry has in-
creased substantially. The computers may not be state-of-
the art equipment by Western standards, but it has filled an 
important gap in the Soviet ability to process geophysical 
information.25 
Much of the Soviet Union has already been explored, but 
much of the exploration has been relatively primitive be-
cause the Soviet geologists lacked the more advanced seismic 
technology that has been recently developed in the West. 
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The Soviet Union contains thirty-seven percent of all the 
earth's sedimentary areas, including its continental 
shelves, which have the greatest potential for oil, and the 
West Siberian Basin is one of the largest sedimentary basins 
in the world. In comparing sedimentary area the Soviet 
Union has thirty-seven percent, the Middle East has eleven 
percent and North America has two percent. 26 
The S~viet Union hopes to explore using better foreign 
technology. The Soviets' domestic exploration equipment is 
equivalent to that used by the United States in the 1950s 
and operates poorly at depths greater than 2,000 meters. In 
the late 1970s they purchased from Geosource, an American 
company, several units for mapping geophysical 
information. 27 
Most of the exploration equipment exported to the 
Soviet Union has been computers and geophysical equipment. 
The geophysical equipment has consisted of digital seismo-
graphic recorders, magnetometers, gravity meters, and hydro-
phones which have been used for prospecting. Computers have 
been exported that could handle the large amounts of data 
that is associated with seismic surveying. Most of the 
computer hardware has come from American sources, while most 
of the software has been furnished by the French. 28 
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TABLE SEVEN 
UNITED STATES EXPLORATION EQUIPMENT TRADE WITH SOVIET UNION 
(IN U.S. DOLLARS,IN THOUSANDS) 
1977 1978 1979 
Exploration 
Geophysical 480.7 862.5 2,022.6 
Computers 3,643.4 17,578.3 22,311.0 
Total Exploration 4,124.1 18,440.8 24,333.6 
,. 
Source: Department of Commerce 
Drilling 
Oil wells are drilled with a bit which is a tool that 
bites into the earth as it creates a bore hole. In the 
early days of the oil industry the holes were dug by hand, 
but this was soon replaced by a system which used a chisel-
shaped bit that moved up and down on the end of a rope and 
simply pounded a hole into the ~arth. Today technology has 
progressed greatly and the oil wells are dug using sophisti-
cated metals and alloys to create a wide variety of pre-
cision tools which are used on different types of rocks and 
drilling conditions. 2 9 
As drilling techniques developed, new technology and 
equipment has come into place. The ropes that were used to 
raise and lower the drill bit were replaced by drill pipe, 
which is still referred to as the drill string, made of 
high-quality steel. The muddy water that was used to pump 
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into wells to keep the bit cool and flush out debris has 
been replaced by "drilling mud" which is a chemically 
designed mixture of water, clay, and chemicals. Drilling 
rigs are the hoists and derricks from which the drill bit 
and pipe are suspended. The drilling rig is responsible for 
supporting, raising, and lowering the drill pipe and bit 
into the well. These structures have grown and today hoist 
weights of peveral hundred tons. Tubular steel casings have 
replaced wooden stakes to form supports for wells and keep 
them from collapsing. Safety devices such as blowout pre-
venters have been added to keep wells from exploding when 
gasses or liquids escape under high pressure. Well-logging 
instruments are now available. "These are lowered into the 
well on cables and measure the density and permeability of 
the geological structure surrounding the well, allowing 
geologists to estimate the quantity and recoverability of 
potential reserves." 3 O 
The quality of Soviet drill bits has long been a 
problem for Soviet planners. The Soviets have continued to 
use "roller bearing" bits which are not as advanced as the 
"journal bearing" bits produced in the West. The roller 
bearing bit has a number of small rotating elements, while 
the journal bearing has two close-fitting parts. The 
journal bearing bits offer a larger surface area and last 
1 . b't 31 anger than the roller bearing l s. 
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The Soviet Union is concerned about drill bit quality 
and, therefore, purchased an American drill bit manufac-
turing plant from Dresser Industries. This p+ant, once 
fully operational, will be able to p~oduce 100,000 bits per 
year, with 86,000 being highly advanced tungsten carbide 
insert bits. Dresser will furnish plans for thirty-seven 
separate bits to be produced in the plant. 32 
The bits produced in the Dresser-built plant are hoped 
r 
to last two to four times longer than Soviet-made bits. 
This plant, once producing at full capacity, and without 
additional rigs, has the potential to produce enough bits to 
allow an increase in meterage drilled of ten to twenty 
percent which could mean an increase of three to six percent 
in oil production. 3 3 
Soviet drill pipe has been adequate for wells down to 
2,500 meters, but the pipe often fails at greater depths. 
Soviet drill pipe does not perform well after 2,500 meters 
because of the weight and stress at these greater depths. 
The problem facing the Soviet Union, when it comes to drill 
pipe production is that it is quantity, not quality, that is 
stressed by Soviet planners. This causes the pipe to have 
defective threads and joints that cannot withstand extre me 
temperatures and fails to protect pipes from corrosion and 
parafin buildup. The poor quality of pipe can cause the 
drill string to break, dropping the bit and other parts into 
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the well, forcing the well to be shut down until the pieces 
can be removed and replacement parts brought in.34 
Drill pipe has been purchased by the Soviets from the 
West. - It is generally accepted that the imported pipe is 
used on deeper wells. These deeper wells account for five 
to ten percent of Soviet oil production. The importance of 
Western pipe will increase as wells increas~ in depth.35 
The S~viets have always been frustrated by poor drill 
bit quality and pipe quality. So far the Soviets have been 
successful in purchasing a drill bit plant from Dresser 
Industries. These drill bits should make it possible for 
them to drill faster and deeper using their turbo-drill 
system. The Soviets have also bought foreign steel mills in 
an effort to improve the quality of drill pipe. They also 
hope to purchase a foreign rotary drilling plant. 36 
The Soviet Union produces most of its drilling rigs and 
hoisting equipment itself. The Soviet Union has been 
improving both its quality and quantity of rigs and hoisting 
equipment but it has not been able to achieve the right mix 
of equipment. The oil drilling association has complained 
that it is over-supplied with rigs designed to drill greater 
than 5,000 meters, but does not have . enough lighter rigs to 
drill in shallower areas. The Soviets are now switching to 
a unitized rig; these rigs can be assembled by one crew 
instead of several crews, are lighter, and can drill to 
3,300 meters at a faster speed. 37 
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The Soviets have imported unitized rigs from the West. 
The Soviets' desire to drill faster and deeper in this 
decade will require them to import additional rigs. The 
demand for oil rigs will continue and the Soviets will 
continue to import. 38 
Soviet well-logging is considered to be poor. This can 
be attributed to two problems: I the use of the turbo-drill, 
and the lack of quality field instruments. The turbo-drill 
,.. 
produces erratic and irregular walls in the borehole. The 
irregular walls have drilling mud packed into the cracks and 
fissures of the wall, which makes it difficult to study the 
actual geological structure. Soviet well-logging equipment 
essentially copies American equipment sent to the Soviet 
Union during lend-lease and after the Second World War. 
Soviet research institutes have developed instruments that 
are comparable to Western state-of-the art instruments, but 
. d t' 39 these have not been fully tested and put into pro uc ion. 
The Soviet Union has imported well-logging instruments 
from both France and the United States but not in large 
quantities. Wells which have used Western equipment in the 
Soviet Union have been completed three to ten times as fast 
and with greater accuracy. To increqse overall logging time 
in the Soviet Union would require them to import at least 
enough equipment to equip 100 crews and allow Western tech-
. t 40 
nicians to train the crews how to operate the equipmen · 
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Blowout preventers, in the Soviet Union, are only used 
when drilling in new areas, and in areas where underground 
conditions cause high pressures, or where corrosion is ex-
pected to cause problems. Once the initial wells have been 
drilled they are rarely used. The Soviets have imported 
some blowout preventers from the United States but not in 
large numbers. The Soviets usually import blowout prevent-
ers from Romania which has recently bought an American 
~ 
designed blowout preventer plant. 41 
TABLE EIGHT 
UNITED STATES DRILLING EQUIPMENT TRADE WITH SOVIET UNION 
(IN U.S. DOLLARS, IN THOUSANDS) 
1977 1978 1979 
Pipe 1.9 404.7 579.2 
Bits 147.2 
Rigs 8,272.0 33,247.9 37,235.3 
Total Drilling 8,421.1 33,652.6 37,814.5 
Source: Department of Commerce 
Production 
Oil production can continue from a well after it has 
lost its natural reservoir pressure by introducing secondary 
and tertiary recovery techniques. In 1980, over eighty-five 
percent of the oil was obtained by the secondary recovery 
technique known as waterf looding. In West Siberia, 
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ninety-nine percent of the oil is obtained by waterf looding. 
This has helped raise the initial recovery rate while 
reducing the number of producing wells required per unit of 
land. This has allowed the Soviets to conserve capital by 
reducing the outlays for drilling equipment. 42 
Mechanical assistance is required to recover the oil 
and water when waterflooding has occurred. This is usually 
accomplished with pumps such as the sucker-rod pump and the 
electric submersible pump. Sucker-rods work like plungers; 
they are powered by surf ace pumps and have tubes that run to 
the bottom of the well. Sucker-rod pumps are less efficient 
in deeper wells. Electric submersible pumps, along with 
their motors and electric cables are lowered into the well 
itself. They are used when high pumping rates are required. 
An alternative to pumps is gas-lift equipment which pumps 
gas into the oil column in the well bore. 43 
The Soviet Union has a substantial capability for pro-
ducing electric submersible pumps, but these require more 
maintenance than their Western counterparts. The American-
built submersibles can pump 1,000 tons of fluids per day and 
can last five times longer than the Soviet built ones. 44 
By 1978, the Soviet Union had purchased about 1,500 
American pumps with deliveries staggered over several years. 
It appears that the American pumps have a lifetime of three 
to six months before they need major service. The Soviets 
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have asked for training in pump repair but the United States 
has refused them so far.45 
Since 1971 the Soviet Union has imported American-made 
submersible pumps because they found them to be more ef f ec-
tive than native built pumps. More and more pumps are being 
needed as the Soviets continue to inject water into oil 
fields in an effort to increase pressure so more oil can be 
pumped out. In the Volga-Urals region the water to oil that 
is being pumped out is about fifty-fifty. The Soviets are 
also beginning to have water problems in the Samotlor field 
in West Siberia. 4 6 
Tertiary recovery methods are very expensive and are 
relatively experimental even in the West. The Soviets have 
experimented with a variety of methods including steam 
injection and polymer flooding. The high cost of using 
tertiary methods has been a major barrier to increased oil 
production. 47 
In the late 1970s, the Soviets turned to other methods 
that had been used in the West for secondary recovery pro-
cedures. The Soviets have turned to steam injection, which 
is useful when breaking up high-viscosity crude oil which is 
not affected by water injection. The application of deter-
gents, carbon dioxide, and the injection of natural gas 
instead of water has also been used. The type of petroleum 
determines which method should be used. 48 
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The Soviets are having to import equipment costing 
hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States and 
other West European countries. These different types of gas 
lift processes are used to supplement reservoir pressure. 
These processes have led to increased production in Grozny 
and Baku after many years of falling production. The pur-
chase of secondary recovery equipment has increased output 
production in some of the older Baku fields threefold from 
r 
300,000 to one million tons a year. 49 
The Soviets have recognized that the use of water 
injection is not suitable for Samotlor and Fyodorovsk 
regions and therefore has signed a $226 million contract 
with a French company to install a gas lift system. The 
Soviets are also putting this new learned technlogy to work 
in other fields. One year after the contract had been 
signed, they claimed it was being used with good results. 50 
In late 1977, the Soviets signed a $23 billion contract 
with Pressindustria of Milan, Italy, for a plant to 
manufacture 250,000 tons of non-ionic .surfactant a year to 
enhance recovery. A few months later they signed a $36 
million contract to buy two carbon dioxide liquefaction 
plants from Borsig, of West Germany . . Carbon dioxide is used 
to increase the pressure in the reservoir. 51 
The Soviets have been experimenting with several types · 
of recovery techniques. The Soviets have purchased two C02 
recuperation/liquefaction plants with the combined capacity 
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of over 400,000 tons per year and a chemical surfactant 
plant with a one million ton per year capacity, both from 
West Germany. The benefits of secondary recovery techniques 
are still being explored through testing and experimentation 
in the West as in the Soviet Union. 52 
Refining 
The quality of Soviet refined products has been poor, 
the result of poor planning and the lack of investments into 
this section of the petroleum industry. The quality and the 
mix of petroleum products has been low and the Soviets are 
now trying to improve it. Poor motor fuels and lubricants 
have been responsible for a decrease in the efficiency and 
1 if e span of machinery and it has led to increased main-
tenance and repairs. The Soviets have also made attempts to 
reduce the amount of oil and oil product losses that occur 
during the refining process. 53 
The octane of Soviet gasoline is between sixty-six and 
seventy-two, which is well below the United States, which is 
around ninety octane. Soviet economists believe that the 
cost savings from increased octane ratings would make fuel 
and performance improvements through higher compression 
. . . th f. 54 ration far exceed the cost of improving e re 1nery. 
The Soviets in the past have imported large amo nts of 
refining equipment from Eastern Bloc countries. The equip-
ment they have imported from the West has consisted of 
complete refineries rather than parts. The improvements 
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that the Soviets are planning for the refinery industry will 
require additional assistance. The Soviets will require 
Western assistance for microprocessors and minicomputers 
that are used in refinery operations. The Soviets need to 
improve their secondary refining techniques such as hydro-
cracking and catalytic cracking. These techniques do not 
depend upon advanced technology but are dependent on com-
puters. s s H7drocracking and catalytic cracking are 
techniques used to break up heavy hydrocarbon molecules to 
form lighter molecules which are used in motor fuels and 
aviation gasoline.S 6 
Soviet imports for oil refining equipment has been 
considerable over the last decade. Most of the equipment 
that they need to import is available on a worldwide basis. 
The area in which the Soviets are most dependent on the West 
is for the advanced microprocessors and minicomputer control 
systems. So far these systems have not been given a high 
priority. The Soviet Union has the ability to build the 
hardware for such a system, but lacks the experience for 
building the software and associated control devices. 57 
It appears that "systemic constraints and incentives 
will impede the development and introouction of computerized 
refinery process control system much more than will problems 
with the technology."S 8 Western imports may help improve 
the efficiency of refine .ies, but for now the Soviets are 
relying predominantly on domestic developments. 59 
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The Soviet Union will continue to build new refineries, 
especially in West Siberia and the East, near the source of 
the supply of oil. They will continue to improve the 
refinery production mix and the quality of their products. 
It is likely that the Soviets will continue to import 
Western technology especially in the form of complete 
refineries. 60 
Off shore 
The Soviet Union possesses extensive offshore oil 
potential. The Arctic, Baltic, Black, Caspian, and Okhotsk 
Seas are the most attractive. Drilling has taken place in 
the Black and Baltic Seas, and in the Arctic water of the 
Barents and Kara Seas on a limited basis. Most of the 
Soviets' experience has been in the Caspian Sea. 61 
Exploration of the Caspian Sea has been going on since 
the 1920s, but only recently has the Caspian Sea's full 
potential been realized. The Soviets have only recently 
developed the capacity to drill in water deeper than 200 
meters. In 1975, the "28th April" deposit was a major 
d . . d . t . th 62 iscovery and has since spurre interes in e area. 
The Soviet domestic offshore capabilities need to be 
greatly upgraded. In the late 1970s the domestic stock 
consisted of seven jackup rigs and two semisubmersible rigs. 
Jackup rigs have hydraulically operated legs which are 
extended down to the sea floor and then the entire rig is 
raised clear of the water to permit drilling. Modern 
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jackups are limited to working in water 300 feet or less. 
Semisubmersibles are built on pontoons and are floated over 
the drill site. Once over the drill site the pontoons are 
partially flooded, which provides a stable platform from 
which to drill. These rigs are usually anchored into posi-
tion or employ a dynamic positioning system which keep them 
over the drill site.63 
The Soviet Union has lagged behind the West in off-
shore drilling and has ·turned to the West when their 
domestic industries failed to do the job. They have bought 
semisubmersible offshore oil rigs, and the technical know-
how to build their own. These rigs will operate not only in 
the deeper parts of the Caspian and Black Seas, but also in 
northern waters of the Barents, White, and Kara Seas. The 
Soviets have turned to foreign sources because of the 
seriousness of their need to increase production. 64 
Semisubmersible rigs have been purchased from Norway 
and Japan. A Japanese consortium has also provided several 
jackup rigs for exploratory drilling off Sakhalin. These 
rigs were operated by Japanese-trained Soviets, and a 
Japanese supervisor was on each rig. 65 The Soviets have 
purchased sufficient geophysical equipment to outfit two 
geophysical ships they brought from Mitsubishi of Japan. 
The Soviets have hired Western geophysical ships to conduct 
offshore surveys. 66 
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The drill ships and other offshore assembled rigs are 
supplied to the Soviet Union with American technology, 
either made in the United States or through their overseas 
subsidiaries and licensees. The prime power used on the 
rigs is usually diesel-electric, and these are supplied by 
the major diesel manfacturers in the West. Diving equipment 
for the rigs has been furnished by the French and the United 
States. Th~ subsea blowout preventers are supplied by the 
United States as well as the well completion stacks. 67 
The Soviets have purchased or contracted for off shore 
exploration, drilling, and production equipment from many 
Western countries. It has recently acquired its own 
capabilities to build jackups and semisubmersibles from 
Western technology imports. The Soviets have contracted 
with a Finnish firm for three drill ships for use in Arctic 
waters. These ships are based on Dutch design and are being 
fitted with the latest Western technologies. These ships 
will give the Soviets their first deep drilling and subsea 
completion capabilities. 68 
Transportation 
The Soviet Union is looking forward to a future of oi 1 
and gas exports, to do so they must continue to modernize 
their petroleum industry. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan calls 
for a massive reallocation of resources within the 
industrial sector, in favor of energy. In the past few 
years energy has become the chief policy concern of the 
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Soviet leadership. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan sets very 
ambitious targets for energy production, with natural gas 
investment doubling. This means an increase of 20 billion 
rubles for the natural gas industry. 69 
Investment in the energy sector during the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan is expected to increase by 132 billion rubles 
which will be 85.6 percent of the planned increment for the 
overall industrial investment. Energy sector analysts in 
,. 
the West question whether or not the Soviet energy sector 
can absorb these massive increases in funding over a short 
period. If the Soviet economy continues to grow as slowly 
as it did during the late 1970s and early 1980s the energy 
demand might even stagnate. 70 
In the petroleum industry of the Soviet Union there are 
certain key sectors in which Western technology plays an 
important role. The purchase of large-diameter pipe and 
compressor station units are of immense importance. 71 The 
Soviets have been dependent on the West for much of its pipe 
which is larger than forty inches in diameter. These pipes 
are used in the main-line high-pressure transport system for 
oil and natural gas and are of Arctic quality pipe. The 
Soviet steel industry is capable of P!oducing forty, forty-
eight, and fifty-six inch pipe and a substantial amount of 
the pipeline is domestically produced. Pipeline, though, is 
imported to avoid bottlenecks that occur from insuf~icient 
production and because domestic pipe tends to be lower in 
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quality. The Soviets are improving their pipe production 
capabilities by purchasing seamless pipe manufacturing 
capabilities from French and German firms. 7 2 
The Soviets have purchased pipeline boosters, pumping 
stations, and gas compressors from the West, with gas com-
pressors being the most important. The Soviets do not 
produce enough gas compressors domestically and those they 
do are of lower quality and not as powerful as Western 
... 
models. The Soviet Union has been importing gas-turbine-
powered compressors and equipment from the West in sub-
stantial amounts since 1973. 73 It is impossible to know how 
much the Soviets have benefited from the Western technology, 
but "one Western expert has estimated that pipe and com-
pressor imports together may well have paid for themselves 
within two years, given the acceleration of gas transport 
capacity they allowed. 1174 
The Soviet Union has purchased more than $10 million 
worth of pipelines to large producing gas fields. The 
Soviets have plans for ten domestically produced pipeline 
computer automation systems. These systems will reduce the 
amount of time needed to detect leaks, improve pipeline 
maintenance, and improve the management of the flow of gas 
and oil. If these systems are introduced, and the Soviet 
domestic industry is unable to produce the equipment in the 
needed quantity and quality they may turn to the West for 
assistance. 75 
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TABLE NINE 
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT TRADE WITH U.S.S.R. 
(IN U.S. DOLLARS, IN THOUSANDS) 
1977 1978 1979 
Pumps 3,674.3 1,241.9 9,979.7 
Pump Parts 11,743.9 242.9 17,613.2 
Gas Compressors 5,432.3 5,937.8 
Total Comp/Prod 20,850.5 7,422.6 27,592.9 
Source: Department of Commerce 
Studies of the Soviet Petroleum Industry 
Thane Gustafson's The Soviet Gas Campaign discusses the 
politics and policies of Soviet decision makers towards 
natural gas. Gustaf son states that, "One of the most impor-
tant reasons why Soviet leaders import Western capital 
equipment is to give themselves a 'fast start' in a new 
policy initiative, so they need not wait for sluggish 
domestic producers to make the necessary innovations or 
reach the necessary output capacities and quality levels 
before forging ahead. 1176 Western technology helped 
Khruschev launch his chemicalization drive in the 1950s and 
Brezhnev when he expanded the automobile and truck industry 
in the 1970s. Soviet industry has not been incapable with 
supplying what is needed, but turning to outside sources has 
given the Soviets the flexibility that the command system 
cannot supply. 77 
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In the gas industry, foreign technology has been on the 
leading edge of Soviet advances for many years. Western 
technology has supplied most of the advances involved in the 
transmission of Soviet gas. The Soviet gas industry has 
moved towards larger and larger diameter pipe along with 
higher pressure, and longer lines. 78 . 
"Relying on foreign equipment suppliers tends to in-
hibit domestic innovation. It takes time and additional 
resources to absorb it properly into the domestic economy, 
and while that process is going on it disrupts established 
lines of supply. 1179 Western technology costs the Soviets 
hard currency, and in the end they are not guaranteed that 
the new technology is what they truly need. 80 
For the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), the plan 
calls for an East-West export pipeline and for six domestic 
fifty-six inch pipelines, as well. The Soviets are relying 
on Western equipment for a great deal of the pipeline net-
work. The Soviets will also have to import Western com-
pressor stations. The plan calls for 320 new compressor 
stations totaling 25,000 megawatts, of which 22,000 mega-
watts are supposed to be supplied by the Soviet domestic 
industry. This means that the domestic industry will have 
to increase its output by 1,600 megawatts during the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The Soviet planners may be over 
optimistic about the ability of their domestic industry to 
build gas-pipeline compressors, but it is not the first 
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time. In the last two five-year plans the Soviets had high 
expectations of their domestic industry, only to turn to the 
Western suppliers later in the plan when domestic output 
could not meet the plan. 81 
"The core of Soviet problems in economic decision-
making is the malfunctioning of the planning system. It 
fails to provide policy makers with a clear and integrated 
picture of ~he choices before them and to provide implemen-
tors below with a coherent and realistic blueprint of what 
they are supposed to do. 118 2 
The gas campaign was poorly planned. The targets were 
set and the work was started before planners had figured 
where the necessary equipment would come from. The amount 
of gas the campaign was to produce was more than the economy 
would be able to absorb. The plans called for more gas to 
be produced than could be consumed and did not require 
adjustments to be made to consume it, and which of two 
fields to be used was not decided on until after construc-
tion started. 83 
The high priority of the gas campaign did not spare the 
gas industry the three classic problems of Soviet manage-
ment. "First, most Soviet industria~ ministries, being 
large, vertically integrated hierarchies, do well at 
focusing efforts on their major targets, but poorly at 
meshing horizontally with other ministries. Second, the 
incentive system in which the Soviet ministries must operate 
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encourages them to concentrate on intermediate indicators 
of performance, often to the detriment of the final goals 
desired by the leaders. Third, th~ targets are too numerous 
and demanding for Soviet ~anagers to hope to meet them 
all." 84 This usually means they put the total output of 
production first and product quality and reliability, spare 
parts, and housing for workers in the background.85 
The Sovjets are devoting seventy percent or more of the 
new investment for the gas industry to pipelines. This has 
caused the Soviets to hold back investments in gas fields 
and distribution centers. The development of housing, 
roads, power plants, and the urban infrastructure are behind 
and do not meet the basic needs. This, in the future, may 
slow the output of gas from West Siberia. 86 
"For the Soviets to free themselves of foreign depen-
dence will be expensive and will take at least another five 
years of top-priority efforts. Soviet industry faces a dual 
challenge, to overcome the unreliability of low efficiency 
of the existing pipeline network and simultaneously to move 
up to the next generation of pipeline technology, which will 
operate at 100 or 120 atmospheres instead of the present 
seventy-five.1187 The Soviets hope to use higher pressures 
by the second half of the 1980s and are already domestically 
producing a multi-layered pipe which will be able to handle 
the higher pressures. 88 
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The Office of Technology Assesment's Technology and 
Soviet Energy Availability finds that the Soviet Union is 
purchasing Western imports in a number of areas where it 
produces large quantities of the same items that it is 
importing. The Soviet Union, for the most part, does not 
lack the know-how to provide for itself, but it does not 
produce enough high-quality equipment because "the structure 
of its economy and its incentive system are such that it has 
,. 
difficulty producing sufficient quantities of high-quality 
equipment. 1189 Items purchased from the West usually are of 
higher quality than those produced by Soviet domestic 
industry. Western equipment is imported by the Soviets to 
compensate for the shortfalls of Soviet domestic industry. 90 
Western equipment has clearly helped improve the Soviet 
petroleum industry, but it is not known to what extent. The 
Soviets will not depart from past practice of importing 
Western equipment and seeking hands-on training. 91 The 
Soviets will continue to purchase Western equipment to 
supplement domestic stock when demand runs high and/or pur-
chase equipment for a specific difficult task. Some of the 
equipment that the Soviets have purchased will be used for 
laboratory examination and duplicati?n, or to serve as 
guides to correct problems in domestic stock. 92 
The Soviets have not purchased many items that are 
basic to the petroleum industry, such as magnetometers, 
gravimeters, mud-pumps, pipe insulation, and offshore 
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floating production centers. The omission of these can be 
interpreted in a number of ways: "that the Soviet Union and 
its Eastern Bloc allies have an adequate industrial base to 
meet their needs, even if they are inefficient by Western 
standards; lack of hard currency has forced policy makers to 
choose other types of equipment which has higher priority; 
or that the Soviets have made a policy decision that it 
should remajn free of Western supplies in these critical 
areas of the petroleum industry. It is most likely that a 
combination of factors is at work."93 
The Soviets will continue to rely on Western imports 
for large diameter pipe. Imports of pipe have been con-
sistently large and seem to be needed because domestic 
production is insufficient. 94 The Soviets have purchased 
from the West a seamless pipe manufacturing plant, which can 
produce 170,000 metric tons per year. The pipe is necessary 
as the Soviets hope to continue to bring more natural gas to 
its consumers.95 
Marshall I. Goldman's The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: 
Half-Empty or Half-Full? found that "if they can obtain the 
foreign technology, the Soviets should be able to avail 
themselves of some significant output gains through enhanced 
recovery techniques. 11 96 Discoveries of new fields will 
ensure increased output in a decade or so. The Soviets will 
have to put to better use enhanced recovery methods to 
. . 97 increase output in the near term. 
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"A complete overhaul of the whole planning system would 
go a long way towards postponing the depletion of Soviet 
wells and increasing the discovery of new wells."98 There 
are other less radical solutions that Soviet leaders can 
turn to. The Soviets can turn to enhanced recovery tech-
nology, and if they cannot invent new methods they can 
import it from the West."99 
The Soviets in the past have relied mostly on water 
injection as a secondary recovery method; it has been used 
on eighty-six percent of the wells. Other alternative 
methods that the Soviets have used are steam injection, 
which is useful when breaking. up high-viscosity crude oil, 
the application of detergents, carbon dioxide, and the in-
jection of natural gas into the reservoir instead of water. 
The skilled application of the proper technique on a well 
can increase yields by fifty percent. 100 
The Soviets have gradually started to utilize these 
techniques, which meant importing most of the equipment, 
costing hundreds of millions of dollars, from the West. The 
Soviets started to import secondary recovery methods in 
1977. Between 1976 and 1978, these methods were responsible 
for only 0.4 percent of total output; by 1979, it had in-
creased to two percent. This was only the beginning, and 
there are problems that the Soviets will have to face if 
they wish to increase production significantly. Each field 
has to be custom-fitted with its own special enhanced 
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recovery system. This takes time, skill, and enormous sums 
of money. 101 "The Soviets have a long way to go before they 
have the incentives, know-how, or the equipment to take full 
advantage of the potential that is available."102 
The drilling range of the Soviet Union is 2,000 meters, 
which is adequate, but future fields will be much deeper. 
The Soviets' turbo-drill and seismographic systems cannot 
reach depths between 2,500 to 5,000 meters where they hope 
to find oil. The Soviets are now using the new technology 
they purchased from the West, and are having some positive 
results. 103 
The Soviets are developing some of the more difficult 
sites as joint-development ventures with foreigners on 
Soviet territory. This shows how serious the Soviets are 
about developing these fields. Since the Second World War 
the Soviets have only had joint ventures with foreigners 
outside of the Soviet Union's territory. Recently the 
Soviet Union has talked about an ongoing production and 
royalty relationship with the Bendix Corporation, but 
nothing concrete has occurred. This shows that the Soviets 
are willing to make exceptions about foreigners operating in 
1 . 104 the Soviet Union when it comes to petroleum exp oration. 
There have been other joint ventures off the coast of 
the Soviet Union on the island of Sakhalin. The Soviets, in 
cooperation with the Japanese Petroleum Development 
Corporation, finally found petroleum and gas in 1977, after 
95 
a three-year search. The Soviets' contribution was the work 
site and labor, while the Japanese-led consortium contrib-
uted $170 million to finance the venture. The Soviet Union 
and the consortium will split the revenues on a fifty-fifty 
basis if and when they become commercially profitable.105 
The Soviet Union has been negotiating contracts with 
British Petroleum, Phillips Petroleum, and Armco in which 
the companies will set up operation on Soviet territory in 
the deeper parts of the Caspian and Barents Sea. A French 
and British company has reportedly already been drilling in 
the Barents Sea. The Soviets hope that these deals will 
start producing almost immediately with results in as little 
as two years. This amount of time is not unrealistic since 
it only took this much time to start North Sea oi 1 produc-
tion by many of these companies. 106 
Some of these projects between Western companies and 
the Soviet Union involve sharing any of the ultimate produc-
tion, especially if they find oil as opposed to natural gas. 
This shows how important finding new petroleum deposits is 
to the Soviet Union. The Soviets in the past have been 
sensitive to foreigners working in their territory and in 
the past have rejected profit-sharing joint ventures. The 
fact that they are willing to make these exceptions shows 
the high priority the Soviets put on finding new petroleum. 
It appears that they are wi lling to compromise some of their 
96 
idealogical principles to facilitate the search for new 
oil.107 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper was undertaken to study the impact Western 
technology has upon the Soviet economy, and how the length 
of time an industry has been statused as a high priority 
importer of Western technology has affected the Soviet 
capabilities to innovate. The study compared the chemical 
and petroleum industries because they both have high pri-
ority status to import Western technology. There is also a 
time difference of about fifteen years between the time the 
chemical industry (1958) became a high priority importer and 
the time the petroleum industry (1973) became a high pri-
ority importer. 
The history of both the chemical and petroleum indus-
tries showed that before the Soviet revolution in 1917, they 
were dependent on foreign technology and that rnany of the 
Russian industries were owned by foreigners. After the 
Soviet revolution, the government turned to the West to help 
rebuild their industries with the latest Western technology. 
The Soviets again turned to the West for new technology 
during the Second World war. Lend-lease infused a massive 
amount of technology into the Soviet economy. After the war 
the Soviets increased their technology base by dismantling 
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large segments of German industry as reparation from the 
war. 
The Soviet Union again turned to the West, when 
Khruschev started his "chemicalization" drive in 1958. The 
Soviets needed to upgrade their chemical industry, which was 
not advanced enough to produce large amounts of chemical 
fertilizers and synthetic plastics. Much of the technology 
brought into the Soviet Union was in the form of complete 
turnkey plants or complete sections that were being added to 
already existing plants. 
In 1973, the Soviets started importing large amounts of 
pipeline pipe from the West to supplement their own indus-
trial output. Other types of technology are imported, 
especially in areas where the Soviets are lacking in native 
innovations. The Soviet Union has, so far, been fortunate 
to find large deposits of natural gas and oil in easily 
accessible areas, but these finds have been less common in 
recent years. As the Soviets are forced to drill deeper, 
their equipment becomes less reliable and they have turned 
to the West for more advanced technology. 
The authors of the chemical studies found that the lead 
times for imported plants in the Soviet Union were longer 
than those imported by Western countries. The lead times 
were longer when compared to Western countries but they were 
shorter than if the Soviets had built the plants themselves. 
Since the lead times for imported plants have been shorter 
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than for domestically produced plants, the Soviets have 
become reliant on Western imports as domestically produced 
plants continue to have a lower priority status. 
When the Soviets have used domestic innovation pro-
duction techniques, they have had trouble between the 
research facilities and the produ6tion facilities. The 
production facilities have had to continue to meet their 
production output targets while they were forced to retool 
for their new products. This has caused production managers 
to be reluctant to innovate because there has been no stimu-
lus to innovate, only a stimulus for reaching set production 
targets. 
The importation of Western chemical plants allows the 
Soviets to produce chemicals in their own country, but 
little is learned about how the plant works. Different 
groups in the Soviet Union are responsible for the design, 
construction, start-up and modification, and assimilation 
phases of a chemical plant. This has caused a chemical 
plant to be obsolete before it was ever completed. These 
problems have caused chemical plants, in the Soviet Union, 
to take a longer time to be built and a longer time to reach 
full production capacity. The Soviet Union has continued to 
import Western technology to maintain and update chemical 
industries instead of undertaking systemic changes. 
In the petroleum industry, as well as other industries, 
the Soviets have used Western technology for a "fast start" 
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program so they do not have to wait on the gearing up of 
other domestic industries. The use of imported technology 
allows the Soviet system to be more flexible. In some cases 
the Soviets have started with over optimistic plans, and 
their domestic industries cannot produce enough supplies to 
meet the demands. The Soviets have then turned to the West 
to supplement domestic production. The Soviets then started 
to rely on Western imports, and domestic output no longer 
continued to have high priority status, which then can 
inhibit domestic output in favor of Western imports. 
The planning system in the Soviet Union is based on 
vertical hierarchies which are good at total output pro-
duction quotas, but have trouble meshing horizontally with 
other industries. The planning system does not promote 
incentives for new innovations. Total output of production 
is ranked higher than quality of production, leading to low 
quality goods. This causes domestic goods to be of low 
quality and causes the Soviets to import higher quality 
goods from the West. 
An overhaul of the planning system is unlikely to 
occur, and therefore, the Soviets have turned to the West 
for assistance. The Soviets have formed joint ventures with 
Western companies to seek new petroleum fields. These joint 
ventures show how much the Soviets believe they need Western 
technology. These joint ventu~es are the first time the 
Soviets have agreed to share the profits on ventures that 
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have occurred on their territory. The need to import tech-
nology from the West for the petroleum industry is so great 
that the Soviets have allowed these joint ventures, in the 
hope of increasing petroleum output, especially oil. 
In conclusion, it does not appear that the transfer of 
Western technology to the Soviet Union has been used to its 
full potential. The Soviet Union continues to have problems 
I 
absorbing an~ diffusing the technology into its economy. 
The Soviets appear to still be reliant upon Western tech-
nology for the next generation of technology. 
The long-term growth and expansion of .Soviet civilian 
industries does not appear to be occurring without the 
infusion of Western technology. The Soviets are continuing 
to import Western technology and will have to continue if 
they wish to continue improving the productivity of labor 
and capital. Technology transfers have caused the Soviets 
to be dependent on the West to the extent that the Soviets 
are allowing Western companies to share in profits from 
ventures that take place on Soviet territory. 
The length of time that an industry has had high pri-
ority status does not appear to have helped it become more 
innovative and able to produce the next generation of tech-
nology on its own. To the contrary, the Soviet chemical 
industry continues to depend on Western technology to meet 
its needs more than the petroleum industry. Western tech-
nology is sought by the Soviet chemical industry, in part, 
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because domestic innovation capabilities have been lowered 
over the years as dependency on Western technology has 
grown. The Soviet Union's dependency on Western imports may 
help relieve tension between the two groups. A reduction of 
tension may lead to a greater understanding of each other 
and a continuance of trade. 
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